The Long Arm of Perception and Negative Publicity

As I noted earlier this week there has been a significant reduction in the coverage of private security in the mainstream media of late. This is most likely due to the fact that in the U.S. at least it’s all-hands-on-deck to cover the impending health care reform legislation. But, the lack of negative headlines can also be attributed in part to the general lack of incidents worthy of reporting as well. For that, everyone across the industry can take a piece of the credit. Well done.

An interesting story has developed recently outside of San Diego, California where a local college has decided to end their contract to utilize a local training facility owned by U.S. Training Center, formerly known as Blackwater Worldwide.
The college’s governing board voted unanimously to stop using the ‘Blackwater facility’ in direct response to public criticism, presumably of the facilities affiliation to Blackwater, now Xe. Local activists have protested at Southwestern College board meetings for months in an effort to halt the college’s arrangement with U.S. Training Center and it now appears that those efforts were successful in changing the minds of the governing board of directors.

Earlier this year Southwestern College had entered into an agreement which allowed U.S. Training Center to use rooms on their campus in exchange for time at the U.S. Training Center’s firearms ranges which are only a short distance away.
The question remains is the decision to cancel the agreement just politics and are the cadets of the police academy which Southwestern runs getting short shrift because of it? In other words what is best for the cadets who later go out into the world to enforce our laws?

I see this as a prime example of how a company’s brand is affected widely across sectors. Anyone in-the-know understands that Blackwater Worldwide’s international operations in support of the WPPS contract for the U.S. Department of State has nothing to do with their domestic firearms range businesses outside of their Moyock, North Carolina facility.

If a picture is worth a thousand words then an uninformed sound-byte must be worth ten-thousand in today’s culture. It’s a shame that the governing body has caved to political pressure instead of standing their ground on the merits of the original question and decision making processes which must have been: What facilities best prepare our cadets for a future in law enforcement? Unless a better location has magically materialized in recent months it now appears that cadets will receive inferior preparations all because the facility is ‘owned by’ Xe.

The lessons to be learned here for all PSCs is the importance of protecting your brand at all costs. What you do in one aspect of your business can easily negatively affect the public’s perception of you in other parts of your portfolio of services.

The business of war and profit: Aren’t we proud?

The American Conservative’s Kelley Vlahos had what I thought was some excellent perspective on contracting in her article titled The business of war and profit: Aren’t we proud?

Pretty poignant considering that The American Conservative is not exactly the place you normally find gratuitous contractor bashing.  It’s one thing to take a beating from The  Nation on this subject but when TAC Magazine is on your case maybe it’s finally time to take an honest critical look at ourselves.

Kudos to Vlahos for saying what needs to be said.   Most PSCs put too much emphasis on profit and not enough on staff selection, development, training, management and oversight.  But the U.S. taxpayer is really to blame for not holding their government accountable.

By Kelley Vlahos

You know what prostitutes and pimps and drugs and rape and electrocuted soldiers all have in common? You’re paying for it.

There is such a lack of outrage for the way that private military contractors have pillaged and profiteered from our nearly-decade occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan that it leaves one speechless. Almost. Thanks to whistle-blowers — at the threat of their own security, professionally or otherwise — we have been informed  of some of the basest, grossest behavior coming out of the contracting world on the taxpayers’ dime today. Whether it be soldiers electrocuted by cheap, poorly installed showers by KBR and Triple Canopy, the vodka-drug- fueled pimping frat boys from the Armor Group or the gang rape of a female American contractor by her fellow KBR employees, there is seemingly no end to evidence that the proliferation of privatization has created a runaway Frankenstein of venality, arrogance, avarice and corruption and downright evil, with no restraint that I can see, whatsoever.

Take this latest bit about the Armor Group. Thanks to the Project on Government Oversight, which had the wherewithal to FOIA the goods on this group, we now know that there has been unfettered depravity — including, we heard last week, the procurement of imported, unwitting Chinese girls for sex — at our U.S Embassy. Not surprisingly, there has been a ton of finger-pointing about who knew what and when, but the fact remains that the company got its $187 million contract renewed even after allegations began to surface. Not much different than (Blackwater) Xe, which got its contract renewed in Iraq last week even as their former guards stand trial for murder and the company has banned by the Maliki government for ever working there again.

Allegations of misconduct and corruption on this level go way back — Dyncorp was accused of pimping out skinny, war ravaged girls back in Bosnia. No one seems to care. They just got another contract worth up to $7.5 billion in Afghanistan. They have contracts elsewhere in the expanding U.S footprint, including Africa.

Meanwhile, there are earnest, but ineffective attempts by members of congress to put the brakes on Frank. The Democratic Policy Committee held numerous hearings over the Bush years on these and other subjects of contractor malfeasance, to no real avail. The Commission on Wartime Contracting was created last year and has held some truly eyeopening hearings, even published a nifty report on the 240,000 private contractors now overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan and the companies they work for  — but to what end? As for President Obama, who pledged during his campaign to review the troubling inflation of private contracting and to hold contractors accountable — crickets.

Read the entire article here.

Boys Gone Wild!!! The Kabul Edition

Recent allegations of misconduct, failing to meet contractual obligations, (to say nothing of just general stupidity and juvenile antics) by Armor Group staff at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul raises serious questions about leadership both at Armor Group and at the U.S. State Department.

We’ve yet to hear anyone from Armor Group comment in detail on this case but I can just imagine the way it will sound when it comes out.

We take this very seriously…

we are investigating…

it’s an isolated incident…

we are getting it fixed…

Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, when pressed on questions of contractor behavior of his Blackwater staff likes to say, “Listen, these guys are all patriots, military veterans and professionals.”  As if being a patriot and a veteran meant no oversight is necessary?  It’s another way of saying, “You’re an idiot for questioning us.  We could not possibly do anything wrong.”

History contains any number of idiots who were military veterans and who viewed themselves as patriots yet clearly took actions which were against the interests of the U.S.  One prime example is Timothy McVeigh, who was convicted and later executed for bombing the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995.   The point is that being a veteran does not mean you are faultless or that you don’t need oversight.

Listen, I served as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps and I consider that organization to hold the highest standard in military professionalism.  They are the consummate ‘professional’ but at no time are they ever devoid of oversight or the possibility of prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

The command structure, the rules, regulations, policies, guidelines and standing operating procedures which are normal in any military organization do not exist to any meaningful degree within the private security/military industry.  At best you have a few companies who, relatively speaking, do better than most but even that’s a pretty low standard to meet.

Furthermore, the consequences for breaking rules (that is…the few rules that actually exist) is virtually non-existent.  In the U.S. military the UCMJ governs service personnel and all soldiers, airmen and Marines know that failure to comply with any lawful order, law or rule or even policy or guideline runs the risk of prosecution non-judicial punishment (NJP),  or court martial under the UCMJ.  Again, nothing even close to this exists within the world of private security.  There really is no accountability comparable to the UCMJ and NJP amounts only to dismissal from your current contract.  And we all know that this is, in reality, no punishment at all since the offender often simply pop-ups somewhere else for another firm in a matter of weeks or months.

So, in short…no rules to follow at the industry level and no consequences for failing to follow any rules which may or may not exist.  If these were the ingredients for today’s dinner I doubt if anyone would be eating it.

Now then.  That takes care of the industry side of the equation.   What about the client side?  Increasingly it is coming to light that government clients, in contrast with private clients, are systemically inept at managing the procurement, selection and oversight of security contracts.  I have personally worked on contracts which have both private clients and government clients and though neither do a very good job, the government side and in particular the U.S. State Department are painfully ill equipped to do this work.  The reasons for this are puzzling, especially as at this stage, after 8 years of war in Afghanistan and 6+ years in Iraq there are literally hundreds of senior contractors with multiple years of operational management experience who could be hired by State in to sit on the ‘client side’ of the table during contract negotiations as well as during the later phases of contract execution.

For decades the U.S. State Department’s Diplomatic Security Services (DSS) program was always a sleepy little backwater in the security world.  It was, and to some degree still is,  full of lifelong government civil servants who, despite their hard work and good intentions, have not been able to adapt to the pace and complexity that operating in a war-zone imposed on them.  They got pushed into a fast-paced and complex game that they were not prepared for.

But to date this has been like asking a local high school football coach, no matter good his record has been at that level,  to jump into the NFL.   Oh sure, on the surface there are many similarities,  the field is the same dimensions, it’s still 11 vs. 11 players  and the rules are mostly the same and certainly the concepts is the same in principle.  But the speed, level of complexity and knowledge and experience to say nothing of the media attention necessary to perform at the highest level make it impossible for him to take go from High School to the NFL without a natural maturation process which usually involves a stop for many years at the university level.

The DSS small staff of only a couple thousand agents oversees (and I am using that term lightly) over 30′000 contract personnel in the protection of over 200 Embassies and consulates around the world.  But, the problem is that your standard, run-of-the-mill, contract and mission to protect the Embassy in Berlin or even Kuala Lumpur or Mumbai  is still about three solar-systems away from what is required to protect the Kabul embassy.  Kabul and Baghdad are the big leagues and the DSS has not demonstrated anything near the capability of playing on that field.  They certainly do not have a commanding position of respect or authority over the security firms they are supposed to supervise.  At best they are perceived as an administrative nuisance which should be avoided at every opportunity.

To some degree the State Department knows they are are in over their head and they have relied, far too heavily, on the professionalism (I use that term lightly as well…) of the private security sector to pull their bacon out of the fire.  But, as I have alluded to before the professionalism they desire and frankly rely on generally just does not exist.

The State Department needs to ‘grow up’ and on-board  a wave of professional staff to oversee these programs.  Preferably former senior military officers with combat experience.  I can guarantee that if these programs were run by retired Colonels who had on their staff retired Majors and recently separated Captains and a cadre of former Senior Staff NCOs who know how to act professionally and provide security at the same time they will be able to hold accountable any private firm who wins the contract.  Having the, in-house know-how is the first step but State also needs to get a spine and have the guts to dismiss any firm who is not meeting their contractual obligations.  A PSC should be pissing in their boots when a DSS officer is in his AO.  But that only happens when the DSS officer knows what to look for and has the initiative and authority to do something when he sees something amiss.

What State seems to be missing is the fact that everyone in this industry wants the U.S. government as a client.  The State Department is in the drivers seat here.  They can have anything they want.  They can drive a hard bargain and they can run roughshod over any service provider because the line outside for the privilege of winning the contract is long.   You can’t perform?  Next…

State’s problem is they don’t know what to ask for, how to ask for it or know what it should look like when it gets delivered.

With piracy odds in their favor, ships shun armed guards

The small number of successful pirate attacks, an increase in military patrols, and legal concerns have kept many firms from hiring security.
| Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

That statistic, reported during a Senate panel Tuesday in Washington, offers one reason why shipping firms have been unenthusiastic about using armed guards to thwart pirate attacks, leaving the problem to be solved by the US and other militaries.

“Many in the merchant shipping industry continue to assume, unrealistically, that military forces will always be present to intervene if pirates attack. As a result, many have so far been unwilling to invest adequately in basic security measures that would render their ships far less vulnerable,” said Michele Flournoy, the Pentagon’s chief of policy, at the hearing.

As with the “asymmetrical threat” posed by insurgents on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, experts have been taken aback by how quickly a small band of pirates can successfully attack large vessels with millions of dollars worth of cargo aboard. One answer is for shippers to provide for their own security, employing armed security crews to man each ship.

But those crews can be expensive and the shippers don’t necessarily want to spend the money to hire them. And despite the recent high-profile pirate attacks, shippers recognize the odds are in their own favor and essentially see any ransom they may have to pay as the cost of doing business.

About 33,000 ships sail through the Gulf of Aden each year, and there were just 122 attacks in 2008, according to Pentagon officials at Tuesday’s congressional hearing. Of those attacks, only 42 were successful.

Shipping officials also say that arming the ships could create an arms race. “Our belief is that arming merchant sailors may result in the acquisition of ever more lethal weapons and tactics by the pirates, a race that merchant sailors cannot win,” said John Clancey, chairman of Maersk, Inc., which owns the Alabama, during another recent Washington hearing.

Shipping firms are also constrained by legal rules pertaining to port entries for armed private security, as well as insurance issues. Using private security firms is “the most controversial issue that we have right now,” said James Caponiti, top official at the US Maritime Administration, at the hearing.

Still, some private security firms have offered their services. XE, the firm formerly known as Blackwater USA, is reportedly in negotiations to contract with shippers to provide a “security escort service” in the Gulf of Aden with their own 183-foot ship called the MacArthur.

In the meantime, Aegis, the British security firm, is offering a land-based sensor system that could help monitor pirate ship movements. Many experts believe the key lies in targeting the “mother ships” that are used as a base of operations, sometimes more than 400 miles out at sea.

The Pentagon is looking at what role the US should play. Last month, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged a group of officers to look at options for not only for the US military but also other government agencies, including the Departments of State and Transportation. On Monday, the group presented an initial set of findings that included offense- and defense-related solutions for ships at sea, says a military official, as well as solutions that could be effective on shore.

That includes the possibility of a combat action – one of the least desirable alternatives – as well as diplomatic and economic measures.

Military solutions have partly worked. The presence of some 28 nations patrolling the region has pushed some pirates out from the Gulf of Aden back to the Indian Ocean, says Scott Stewart, vice president of tactical intelligence for SRATFOR, an intelligence firm.

But most experts agree that military solutions alone won’t do it. The root causes of piracy stem from poverty, lack of opportunity and lawlessness, things the military simply can’t address on its own.

“Piracy, although generally considered a scourge of the world’s oceans, has its origins on land and has usually been defeated on land as a result of political and economic changes that have evolved over time,” said Sen. Carl Levin (D) of Michigan, who chaired Tuesday’s Senate panel hearing on piracy in Washington. “Ultimately, the solution resides ashore, not just through action on the open seas.”

In the meantime, American officials are urging shippers to take their own precautions to keep the pirates at bay. They run the gamut from rolling up ship ladders, to keeping the perimeter of ships well-lit, to installing barbed wire fences around the sides of the deck.

Nearly 80 percent of thwarted attacks were the result of ships employing some kind of defensive measure, including armed guards, according to Pentagon officials.

“They need to do some things on their own,” says one military official. “Just like … when you drive through a bad neighborhood, you roll up the windows and lock the doors.”

DynCorp International Wins $99 Million Contract to Send Advisors to Iraq

FALLS CHURCH, Va., Nov 05, 2008 (BUSINESS WIRE) — The U.S. Department of Defense has awarded DynCorp International (DCP:dyncorp intl inc cl a
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DCP 14.85, +0.17, +1.2%) a $99 million contract to support and assist the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). DynCorp International will provide up to 128 Senior Level positions for Mentors and Advisors.
MNSTC-I is responsible for providing advisors and mentors to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior. These Ministries control the Iraqi military and police forces. DynCorp International will assist MNSTC-I to transition security responsibilities from Multi-National Forces to the Iraqi government.
The basic indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract was awarded November 1, 2008, and includes a base period plus one option year. The total potential revenue is $99 million.
“We are honored to be awarded this important role in the effort to bring about a full democratic transition in Iraq,” said DynCorp International CEO William L. Ballhaus. “We see this mission as an opportunity to use our valuable experience in international police advising to provide high-level support to our government’s plan to bring about a full and secure transition in Iraq. It is a privilege to do work that not only builds greater security in the region, but also promises to improve people’s lives and offer them stability and security in their communities.”

SOC Seeking Qualified Operators

Below is a thread I picked up recently via my network.  I know nothing about this company so I cannot offer any relevant advice as to them. 

Jake

___________________________________________________________

SOC, (www.soc-usa.com) is currently gathering interest for future operations of 100+, highly-trained, special-operations skilled individuals.  ***Candidates MUST have 6 years of documented experience in world-wide special operations (NO exceptions)!!!

This mission is subject to contract award.

All who are offered employment with SOC will operate in a low visibility PSD, high threat environment.

 ***MUST meet one of the following clearance requirements:

a) Active Interim Secret

b) Active Secret clearance or higher

c) Verifiable through our Security Officer a valid security investigation with a DoD/DoS angency within the last 5 years.

PAY is extremely competitive!!!

All Candidates who meet these qualifications and are interested, please send an updated resume and DD-214 to Angela Broyles at: abroyles@soc-smg.com ASAP.
***Deadline for candidate interest is NLT 10 Dec.  ***If you are unavailable and/or not interested, please feel free to forward to anyone you think is qualified and ready.  Thanks!
Kindest Regards,
Angela Broyles
SOC Recruiting Team
abroyles@soc-usa.com
www.soc-usa.com

GAO rejects limits on task order reviews

By Matthew Weigelt

Published at FCW.com

Agency officials are pushing back against the Government Accountability Office’s new authority to hear protests of the officials’ task and delivery orders as they explore the power’s limits.

Under a decision made Oct. 30 on a protest of a task order awarded in July, Army officials told GAO that contractors competing for orders can file a protest regarding the order’s initial solicitation but they didn’t have a right to challenge the rationale for the award. That was off-limits, the service officials told GAO, according to the decision. GAO released the decision on Nov. 10.

Meanwhile, GAO officials took a different position. They say contractors now can protest an agency’s decision under the fiscal 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. The law opens for protest all parts of an agency’s order.

In the protest, Triple Canopy, a security and crisis management company, charged the Army’s award of a task order for security services at a base in northern Iraq. Triple Canopy charged that the service didn’t follow through with the solicitation in its award.

Although GAO denied the protest, its decision sketched out more of its authority regarding task and delivery order protests, a new authority since June.

“We view the NDAA’s authorization to consider protests of task orders in excess of $10 million as extending to protests asserting that an agency’s award decision failed to reasonably reflect the ground rules for the task-order competition,” GAO wrote in the decision.

GAO added that Congress didn’t establish a system that requires agencies to tell contractors about competitions, enforces that provision through bid protests “but provides no similar enforcement authority to ensure that agencies actually act in accordance with the guidance they are required to provide.”

The Army is concerned that GAO’s position will “effectively graft the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15 requirements” onto the task order process, according to the decision document.

FAR Part 15 regulations govern competitive and noncompetitive negotiated acquisitions, They include the proposals, awards and notifications to contractors about the acquisition.

GAO also acknowledged some of those FAR rules may apply differently to task orders and other procurements.