The Difference Between Fault and Responsibility
Sep 16, 2009 Commentary, Jake's Posts
By Jake Allen
The more I read about our government in the mainstream media the more I realize how neither one seems to understand the differene between ‘fault’ and ‘resonsibility’. The ArmorGroup fiasco at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is only the latest incident but I will use it here because it is fresh on everyone’s mind and it is particularly illustratrative.
It’s critically important that we separate the terms fault and responsibilty. Some times a person or an entity is both ‘at fault’ and ‘responsible’ but the two are not synonyms. In other words there is room for ‘blame’ or ‘fault’ at both ArmorGroup and at the State Department but the ‘responsibility’ for what happened only comes down in one place.
There is little doubt that the antics being conducted primarily by C-shift on the expatriate guard force was nearly 100% the doing of immature and poorly supervised and lead ArmorGroup contractors. ArmorGroup is ‘at fault’ for hiring these low-end unprofessionals. They are also ‘at fault’ for not properly supervising some of the guard shift changes which left some stations undermanned for very brief periods of time. Much of the ‘blame’ for this rests with ArmorGroup itself since the contract and its execution was structurally flawed in a number of regards in terms of cost estimates, shift requirements, and the list goes on. ArmorGroup is at fault for all of this. From the original under estimates of the work to the poor management of a plan they themselves devised. Incompetence abounded, particularly at the beginning by ArmorGroup leadership in the U.S.
But ArmorGroup is not soley ‘at fault’. Similary, those as the State Department who were responsible for ’shopping’ for security services and a qualified security provider were equally clueless as to what they were actually shopping for. In the end they selected the lowest price offer simply for that reason…price. Firms like Blackwater, Triple Canopy and Dyncorp who had experience performing these services in Iraq were passed over because their prices were deemed to high. Clearly in retrospect their price estimates were much more in the ballpark than those submitted by Armor Group. Furthermore, one of State’s significant decision making criteria was whether or not any potential supplier was already working in Afghanistan and had relevant experience. ArmorGroup did not meet this requirement at the time but because their price was so attractively low a ‘waiver’ was issued so that the in-country experience requirement could be navigated around. So, from the very outset those at State must share the blame for the eventual calamity. And throughout the life of the contract State continued to hide their head in sand even when confronted with facts on the ground which to any reasonable observer would be clear alarm bells.
So if both sides are to blame then who is actually ‘responsible’? See here is the rub. Responsibility cannot be outsourced. Not by you, not by me, not by your town mayor, not your preacher, not a teacher, not your neighbor, not a police officer, not a fireman, not an electrician, not your boss and certainly not civil servants and bureacrats in our government. If you ‘have responsibility’ for something then you own it and cannot give it away. I am ‘responsible’ for ensuring that my kids get a good education. I might ‘rely’ on the local school district to make it happen but that does not abscond me of my responsibility. If they are not getting the education they need it remains my responsibility to take action.
The government of the United States of America and her Department of State are RESPONSIBLE for providing protection to our embassy staff abroad. (Take 5 seconds are read that sentence again…)
If State wants to do it themselves with DSS staff. Great.
If they want to ask the Department of Defense to ‘do me a favor and guard my embassy’. Fine.
If they decide to outsource the work to a private contractor, hey, I am all for it.
But never…ever…at any time or under any circumstances does the responsibility for embassy protection or the performance of those tasked to provide it shift away from the Department of State. Full stop. End of story. When the citizenry of our country begin to hold accountable our own government you will see dramatic improvement in the servce that government provides. Until then just watch the carousel go round and round.
Just follow this story now with this distinction between fault and responsibility in mind and notice how everyone will hold ArmorGroup ‘responsible’ when in truth they were really only partly to blame. You can shirk your tasks but never your responsibility. Wake the f’ up America!! If we don’t see the termination or resignation of about 6 DOS staff as a result of this debacle then you will have only yourself to blame for the next incident that occurs on your watch.
PSC Regulation is not that hard…
May 4, 2009 Commentary, Jake's Posts
By Jake Allen
Last week I was ranting about the private security industry’s lack of movement along the self-regulation front. Industry regulation is not a new theme for me and the subject most recently came up due to the UK Foreign Office’s decision not to take action on regulation. Instead David Miliband, the British Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs is calling on the private security industry to self-regulate by drafting a code of conduct and then encouraging industry participants to sign-on to it.
The problem with this model is that it is precisely what has been tried in the U.S. by the International Peacekeeping Operations Association, IPOA and their member Code of Conduct. The code itself is very comprehensive and IPOA are to be applauded for devoting so much time and energy to develop it. But, the motivation and the mechanics by which a PSC would sign-on and more importantly the authority such an agreement would have are severely lacking teeth and that lack of teeth leads to a lack of credibility.
Codes of conduct are the absolute bare minimum that a PSC should be adhering to. They are a moral floor, they are not the benchmark for industry performance. I encourage all PSCs to sign-up for IPOA membership and commit themselves to this global Code of Conduct but the fact that it is a voluntary effort can never be escaped. The whole point of this debate, in my estimation, is to develop a framework to regulate companies who themselves would likely not volunteer to be regulated.
Actually, self-regulation as such is something I have been calling for for years. But the term self-regulation is a misnomer for my purposes. I don’t any more believe that PSCs can self-regulate than can bankers or stock brokers or pharmaceutical firms or any other commercial segment of the global market. When I talk about self-regulation really what I mean to say is that the industry should show some self-leadership, particularly on the part of the biggest PSCs. These firms should step up and show some leadership and collaborate with government to identify ways in which the industry can be regulated and to take actions themselves and lead the effort in having other entities regulate them in an equitable manner. As it stands now it appears that the biggest players in the market are happy to have confounded governments in London and Washington.
What to do then?
Let me outline specifically how I think our industry should be regulated and the role that legitimate global firms should be taking to lead this effort. Many of these ideas are not uniquely my own but they are what I have been thinking about for a long time after having had a lot of discussions with colleagues as well as others, much smarter than me, who have commented on this subject.
The basic premise of my proposal centers around the creation of a ‘legimate’ market for qualified armed security service providers. By creating a regulated and legitimate market you are simultaneously creating an illegitimate or ‘black market’ for those same services. This then leaves consumers (mostly governments or private firms spending government grants) to decide if they want to purchase from the legitimate market or not. Similarly, it drives PSCs to consider whether or not they want to compete in the legitimate market or not.
Writing the Standard
The UK Foreign Office took a pass on regulating PSCs principally because by their estimation it is too difficult. I am not joking. David Miliband in his open letter for consultation says nearly point blank that regulating PSCs is difficult due to the global nature of the industry and the difficulty any single government would face in enforcing any standards, laws or penalties. Ah yes, the old ‘too hard basket’. When all other logical reasoning fails you can always just throw up your hands and say, “it’s just too hard” let’s talk about something else. Not exactly a shining moment in governmental leadership and certainly not the kind of response to a challenge you’d expect from a global leader.
In point of fact qualifying a PSC would not be that difficult. I propose to have a standard drafted in less than 24 months which would cover the majority of armed security services in the market today. It would take an additional 12 months to initially certify any UK based PSCs or any global PSCs wishing to take payment derived from UK taxpayers, most notably MoD or DFID.
How would I do it? I would form a standards committee made up of UK PSCs such as Aegis Defence, Armor Group, Control Risks Group and others. I would include representatives from other stakeholder communities in government as well as organizations such as Human Rights Watch and/or the ICRC. I would also bring in some standards drafting experts from the British Standards Institute or the United Kingdom Accreditation Society to facilitate the drafting of the standard to ensure that best practices were being applied.
I would then facilitate a series of recurring workshops where the committee members would work with existing standards such as the ISO-9001 Quality Management Standard and other general relevant international standards. I would also use the recently published Montreux Document as well as IPOA’s Code of Conduct and other relevant documents from across the PSC industry.
Look, there is any number of examples of where global industries have solved this problem or made great inroads to standardizing the level of service. The automotive sector which is also global, also deals with life-and-death consequences for poor quality and also has a very diverse and fragmented supply chain network was able to draft the TS-16949 standard. But it was done because the major automotive manufacturers took the lead in collaborating on it.
Certifying Companies
Regardless of how the standard is reached in order to ‘certify’ a PSC as conforming to the standard two separate functions must be employed; assessors and accreditation bodies.
Assessors, also referred to as auditors must be completely independent of the PSCs they are auditing as well as any other PSC in the global market. Through a mixture documentation analysis and on-site physical assessing the auditor will make a determination as to whether or not the PSC is conformant to the requirements contained in the standard. If they are then they are issued a certificate stating as much and placed on a periodic monitoring program and a recertification date in 3 years time. If the PSC is not conformant then a report is issued identifying any major or minor nonconformities and the PSC is given a period of time to take the necessary corrective actions.
Ah but who is checking the checkers you ask? That is the role of the accreditation body or society. The accreditation body issues authority to conduct audits and issue certificates of conformity to the auditing firms.
Leverage Existing Infrastructure
It sounds a little confusing but believe me this is a well beaten path with expertise all over the place which could easily be brought to bear. All of this infrastructure exists already in every country on the planet and could easily be applied to PSCs.
The International Standards Organization (ISO) in Switzerland already authors, issues and in some cases simply adopts external standards through an active committee process. The same could be done in the case of PSCs.
Global auditing firms such as the British Standards Institute (BSI), Det Norsk Veritas (DNV), Securite Generale Surveillance (SGS) in Switzerland and Bureau Veritas in France each have offices in over 80 countries and conduct hundreds of thousand of audits of other types every year. It would not be difficult for organizations such as these to get their hands on a standard and quickly come online with auditing capability.
Lastly every country already has accreditation bodies similar to UKAS the United Kingdom Accreditation Service who issue accreditation rights to the auditing firms for audits conducted on companies in operation in their jurisdiction.
So, again, developing the standard is doable and so is the execution of the audits and the eventual company certifications. We are slowly running out of excuses.
Market Conditions
In order for a system like this to work it requires that the market demand be created by states and state collective organizations such the United Nations, the African Union, the Arab League, etc, etc. This can take a long time to achieve as the decision making process in these organizations can be painfully slow and fraught with political blind-alleys. But just because it is difficult does not mean it should be shelved.
States must enact policy and legislation mandating that armed security services be purchased on the open market in an open bid process from not less than 2 qualified service providers. This is critical to the initial success of the program as it will first create demand for the certification and second add a level of transparency to the procurement process which has thus far been lacking. In the end only those possessing the certification will be rewarded by gaining access to potential revenues precluded from non-certified companies.
Major governments like the U.S. and the UK have made a strategic decision to outsource armed security in many instances. The least they can do it provide a meaningful watchdog function and ensure the their funding is spent with firms who are qualified and regulated.
A grace period
Following the successful pilot program a grace period of say 12 to 24 months should be extended to the entire market. This give PSCs enough time to get their hands on the standard, understand its implications, make any necessary changes to ensure conformity, schedule the audit and either remediate the process or receive the certificate.
Penalties must be in effect at the witching hour for companies who have not managed to conform to the standard. This is another role that governments can play in providing oversight and if necessary the enforcement in the form of financial penalties and if necessary the shutting down of companies who refuse or incapable of conformance.
The argument about the global nature being too difficult to regulate is only superficially correct. There is any number of instances where various industries have worked with governments to build cross-border regulation. And even in instances such as in financial services where both the U.S. and the UK authorities have maintained rightful autonomy there have always been a close working partnership and knowledge of what the other one is doing.
The bottom line
The bottom line here is that regulation is a subject the industry’s leaders should take active leadership in. If for no other reason than leaving it entirely to the politicians will most certainly result in an environment that is fraught with over-reaching restrictions and penalties where the good-guys end up paying the freight for the cowboy’s mistakes even more than they are already doing today.
Self-regulation is not going to fly. We’ve seen that from IPOA’s Code of Conduct. Despite IPOA’s good efforts and the quality of the content in their Code the bottom line is that it lacks wide ranging credibility because it is a voluntary exercise pre-incident and post-incident there are no financially negative consequences for simply taking your name off the signatory list.
The future of our industry is what we make it to be. If we believe that we are adding value and contributing positively to the implementation of governmental foreign policy then we must legitimize our existence by standardizing our services. In doing so we will take large step forward in minimizing the negative occurrences which though rare, reflect poorly on the entire industry.
Drafting a standard for PSCs is not difficult. What apparently is difficult to do is to marshal the political will to do have a crack at it.
Tags: Montreux
Self Regulation? Wouldn’t that be nice…
Apr 27, 2009 Commentary, Jake's Posts
By Jake Allen
The UK government last week issued a statement encouraging PSCs to ‘self regulate.’ In doing so government officials have, I my opinion, missed a huge opportunity to help us advance the cause of legitimizing our work as security contractors. Perhaps that is their long-term aim? I am not against self regulation, who could be? But it’s hardly sufficient, at this stage, to achieve legitimacy and sustainability as an industry. And, to be quite honest self regulation is such a minimum threshold standard to abide by that it should, though it apparently does not, go without saying.
On the one hand I have to commend the government for stopping short of actually doing anything like interfering in something they clearly have no clue about. The only thing worse than doing nothing would be to jump into the fray and start implementing moronic legislation that is unworkable and only serves to hamstring both companies and governments and thus leaving in the lurch the very people who most need protection. Since the authorities in the UK clearly don’t have a plan the best thing to do would have been nothing, and that includes not commenting at all on the subject since that only draws attention to themselves as not being willing or prepared to take or recommend real constructive action.
The concept of self-regulation is so primitive and basic that PMCs should view this as a condescending slap in the face. It’s like being told you need to learn how to wipe your own ass. Apparently they don’t even think we are capable of that lest we would have done it already. I am starting to wonder if they are correct. Perhaps they are observing, as I increasingly am, that the term Private Military Company is a big misnomer since very few PSC/PMCs adopt the discipline inherent in our uniformed military cousins.
Asking PMCs to self regulate is like asking Wall Street banks to self-regulate. We are long past self-regulation. We’ve had ample opportunity to do that in the past decade and we could have done it if we had had real visionary industry leadership as opposed to self-centred corporate greed out to make only fast money at the expense of long-term sustainable revenues. What other fledgling industry can you think of that from day one is already filled with talent rich people who are pre-trained to work in a universally structured and disciplined way? Security contractors are for the most part former military. They by design are already comfortable with rules, regulations, reward, punishment, discipline…structure. This industry and all its participants would expect to fall directly into an environment built on training and accountability. Yet the moment they take off their green uniforms and put on their 5.11s all pretense for responsibility for our actions goes out the window. I ask you, what is that if it not a failure of leadership?
Would’ve…could’ve…should’ve
Sure we could have held ourselves up as a shining example of self-regulation. We could right now be showing the world how we created an industry standard for and how we all signed on to it and how we agreed to be audited by independent parties. Sure we could have run out of town some of the fly-by-night outfits that popped up in Iraq with nothing more than a box of AK’s and website to their name. But no, we turned a blind eye to that kind of self-policing a long time ago and because of our failure to act then we have no credibility to stand on in doing it ourselves now. The only chapter left in this story to write will be when we look back on the period between 2003 and 2009 and we say, “Gee whiz fellas, why didn’t we clean up our own act. We could have built a legitimate, sustainable, dare I say even respectable business model.” No, we will look back on these days as the missed opportunity they really are. A time when former military men, now corporate CEOs got out-foxed and beaten to the punch by a bunch of fat, balding politicians eager to show their constituents that they put an end to our existence.
If discipline is defined as doing what is right in the ABSENCE of supervision we are far from a disciplined force. More of a rag-tag band of carnies traveling the world and burning every bridge when we leave town. Undisciplined forces are untrustworthy and entities that are untrustworthy will not be called on in the future to participate in the actions of our age. We certainly will never be given latitude to operate independently in support of a failing foreign state in the way what Executive Outcomes was able to do. To be honest, right now 9 out of 10 PSCs in business today could not carry the water for EO and should never be given the responsibility they had because they are not capable of achieving even a portion of their success.
Perhaps what we need now is to feel the Corporals lash that will come in the form of heavy-handed government regulation designed in our absence and forced upon us without our input. The only thing preventing that today is the fact that the Brown and Obama administrations are too busy focusing on the economy to deal with the pesky issue of unregulated PSCs. Rest assured our day will come. We are on the government ‘to do’ list. We will receive our summons in due time. The question is what will our recent record be when we are called onto the carpet to give an accounting of ourselves? Will we have a recent record of productive and constructive contribution to the ‘big picture’? Will we have in place a set of governing principles by which we hold ourselves accountable in a meaningful way. Or will we continue to be perceived only as vultures who grow fat and on the carnage created by war?
Though our revenues may increase in proximity to armed conflict that alone does not inherently make us a negative as it is governments themselves who set into motion these conflicts through actions or inaction of their own. For our part we have total control over how our participation is viewed.
Perception is reality
PSC actions in support of combat operations and reconstruction projects is a fact not lost on our enemies or non-combatants present in the combat zone. Non-combatants in particular do not distinguish between U.S. companies, South African companies, British companies or teams from anywhere else. In the case of Iraq anyone not ID’d as being Iraqi is immediately and permanently associated with ‘the Americans’ or ‘the occupiers’. Our behaviour affects ourselves as it affect our brothers in uniform, and vice versa. In short this means that all PSC are, like it or not, for good or for bad, representing U.S. foreign policy. Our actions will reflect well or poorly on the coalition governments and the entire effort to rebuild the country into an ally that we can trade with and perhaps one day put faith into.
There is no status-quo in combat operations. You are either gaining or losing tactical advantage. We as PSCs are either helping or hurting the war and reconstruction effort. To the extent that ‘self regulation’ helps our country advance its foreign policy aims I can support it. But if our recent performance is any indication of industry leadership I keep my expectations very low.
Similarly there is no status quo in public perception of what PSCs do. We are either contributing positively or negatively to the greater effort. That perception is within our control. It starts by running a disciplined team, site, contract and company. It builds by having the disciplined companies forming an alliance to build a framework for what security services are and what that standard is. We can take the lead and do it ourselves in collaboration with other key stakeholders or we can continue to do nothing and then wait for the hammer to one day fall. The choice is ours.
PMCs and anti-piracy, where is the fit? Part I
Apr 16, 2009 Commentary, Jake's Posts, Piracy, Somalia
By Jake Allen
With so much news about piracy lately in the coming weeks I plan to take a look at 3 of the ways that private security firms can find a productive role to play in the counter-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia. The three areas I will be taking a closer look at are:
- Security Guards Aboard/Armed with Lethal Weapons
- Security Guards Aboard/Unarmed or using Less-than-lethal weapons
- Security Guards Adjacent/ Escort Vessels
Security Guards Aboard/Armed with Lethal Weapons
Benefits: The primary benefit of having armed guards on board is that their visual presence alone can serve as a deterrent to an attack. Armed vessels represent what is called a ‘hard target’. In other words, given the choice of attacking a unarmed vessel or an armed vessel the unarmed vessel represents a ‘softer target’ comparatively speaking. Though is not possible to calculate how many attacks were avoided due to a more defensive posture the hard/soft target is widely accepted in most all other criminal circumstances and there is no reason to believe it would not also apply on the high seas. However, many experts counter this argument by stating that the number of attacks do not actually drop they are simply diverted to other ships which appear as easier targets. Yet even if this is so it adds a level of complexity to the pirates planning and execution that he has thus far not needed to account for and over time this can have an effect.
In the event of an attack the armed guards’ presence at the point-of-attack offers considerable tactical advantage and is by far the most likely method for successfully deterring an attack. Especially when compared to an unarmed guard approach or a escort vessel method of security. The physical ’high ground’ afforded by ship’s decks as well as the limited cover and concealment offers significant advantages tactically during a fire fight should one occur.
4 to 6 qualified marksmen armed with weapons that are effective at point-targets out to a distance of 800 meters would be all that is required to successfully repel a coordinated pirate attack. This use of force must be only applied within the framework of Rules of Engagement which are well defined and commonly interpreted.
Challenges/Limitations: The difficulty in executing the ’armed guard’ scenario are a mix of logistics and legal. The area where armed guards may be necessary in relation to the overall distance travelled on most journeys is relatively short. The typical westbound journey which originates Asia bound for a European port could take between 3 and 4 weeks. During that time armed guards may only be necessary for less than 5 days. In the case of the Horn of Africa region the shipping carrier has no need for armed guards prior to reaching the western Indian Ocean and would no longer need the guards once it entered the Red Sea and would most certainly no longer need them as it approached Suez. This leaves the carrier rightfully unwilling to pay for the guards when they are not necessary.
From the security company’s perspective getting their guards onboard when needed and off when not presents a real logistical challenge requiring a footprint somewhere along the northern shore between Oman and Saudi Arabia or on the southern shore between Somalia and the Sudan. A simple map reconnaissance and knowledge of the region can quickly rule out several otherwise ideal geographical locations as being too politically unstable to operate from. The introduction of weapons to the equation adds a level of complexity relative to compliance with laws, regulations, permits, etc, goes up. Notably the pirates are not encumbered by these regulations.
Legally speaking carrying arms aboard a commercial ship can be problematic, especially if the ship wishes to or needs to enter a port with arms onboard. While there is more latitude afforded while steaming in international waters in the case of the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea the proximity to the national waters of Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti, Oman, Eritrea, Sudan and Saudi Arabia add a layer of legal complexity that is difficult for law abiding security companies to overcome.
Perhaps the largest legal challenge to this potential solution are the Rules of Engagement necessary to successfully and defend the ship while protecting unnecessary loss of life. As always it is a challenge to develop and define ROEs that can be commonly interpreted and applied. At the end of the day the final decision to use force is a personal one made a the time by the man on the ground. Some cases are kill or be killed while others leave more room for interpretation and debate. All the more reason why the industry needs a form of certification where by both the company as well as the individual security guards can be vetted, trained and supervised in a way that protects all stakeholders’ perspectives. What the industry cannot afford is a migration of many of the unregulated firms operating in other theatres to quickly find themselves involved in the anti-piracy campaign using the same contractors directly out of Iraq or Afghanistan without undergoing the appropriate training and rehearsals.
Liabilities: The liabilities here are potentially many but they mostly all centre around the assumption that the introduction of armed guard will automatically result an increase in casualties and damage to property. As such the resistance to the armed guards concept is mostly championed by the insurance companies and to a lesser degree the ship owners and financiers. Insurance actuaries crave stability and predictability in order to construct the price of the premiums in relation to the potential payouts. In 2008 ransoms were paid out for 40 ships at an estimated $80 million dollars. While this may seem like a large number, in relation to the premium revenues taken in by the underwriters it remains an operating cost they are comfortable with. In light of the fact that even a single vessel sunk by pirates would trigger the insurance company to incur costs of hundreds of millions of dollars.
Summary: Both the root cause of the piracy problem as well as any eventual solution have their roots in economics. The pirates are active because of the financial benefits relative to the downside for failure. The insurance companies view a few million dollars in ransom payments worth the expense when compared to the catastrophic loss of a ship. The carriers, for their part, remain open to the idea of armed guards but have seen their profits thinned recently due to the slackening demand in the shipping market so they often hesitate to further erode profits by paying private security guards out of what would otherwise be operating profit. Finally the logistical challenges and the web of legal risks involved in conducting security operations in the region mean that the rates for security services are often more than many carriers are able or willing to pay.
3 outta 4 ain’t bad
Apr 13, 2009 Commentary, Jake's Posts, Piracy, Somalia
By Jake Allen
Navy SEALS shot and killed 3 of the 4 pirates holding Captain Richard Phillips hostage. Other pirates active in the region were quoted as saying, “The French and the Americans will regret starting this killing. We do not kill, but take only ransom. We shall do something to anyone we see as French or American from now.” Let’s hope they don’t follow through this threat but it is probably the only thing that would force the civilized world to locate enough of their collective spine to deal with this issue.
The taking of the Maersk-Alabama may turn out to have been a strategic mistake for the pirates in the region. At least in the short run it seems to have brought unprecedented focus onto the piracy problem and could very well have been the final straw. I, like everyone, am so pleased that Mr. Phillips is alive and well. The courage and leadership he displayed in offering himself in exchange for the release of the crew is the stuff of legends and he is to be commended for multiple acts of heroism throughout this drama. It’s hard to imagine a better outcome from an event that seemed so fraught with opportunities for disaster. The sole hostage now safely aboard a U.S. Navy ship, his crew and ship safely moored in a Kenyan port, 3 pirates dead and another in custody is what we call in the trade, ‘a good day out.’
And let’s not miss the chance to acknowledge the work done here by the U.S. Navy. They showed that when on-scene they have the resources and training to accomplish a very difficult mission. Their insurmountable challenge is to be everywhere they are needed all the time and that, of course, is simply not possible.
But while we revel in our good fortune of getting the Captain back alive let us not take our eye off the ball and miss the larger point here. These pirates attacked the Maersk-Alabama with the full knowledge that it was flagged in the U.S. and likely would contain multiple American crew members. The pirates also knew that a ship carrying the name Maersk, the largest shipping carrier on the planet, would certainly be backed by a big insurance policy whose underwriter would, in time, make a large ransom payment.
Despite the dismal outcome for this group of pirates I suspect that had the pirate quoted above held his tongue on that last sentence he likely would continue to enjoy a lot of sympathy from a range of observers. It seems these days the pirates have more support from governments, ship owners, carriers, the military, insurance companies and most everyone else. Ah, the poor Somali pirate; he grew up in a war-torn country, all he ever wanted to be was a peaceful fisherman and spend his time ashore helping old ladies across the busy streets of Mogadishu.
Here is a trivia question for you: What is the one thing most Somali’s would want more than anything? You guessed it, to leave Somalia. And what is one way many Somalis are leaving the country every day? Yep, on boats. So, it is pirates who get that chance to flea every single day. They could take their boats, load them with their families and go to any of a dozen neighboring countries just as many peaceful minded Somali refugees do every day. Just ask the Yemeni authorities how many Somali refugees are turning up on their shores every week. No these pirates are criminals by choice. For all the media condemnation against PMCs and the endless accusations of ‘wide spread’ human rights violations by ‘mercenaries’ where is the outrage against criminal pirates who openly admit that money is their sole motivation?
Ah but these guys are only after the ransom. They don’t intend to harm anyone. This is precisely the kind of argument you will repeatedly hear from our so-called leaders in the U.S. and E.U. capitols. Of course they have never and will never have a loaded gun pointed at them. Certainly not one which is being held by an untrained, uneducated and likely drug induced criminal thug whose only concern is ‘the money’. No these brave and noble leaders will never be forced to live in the hot and stinking hold of a ship like animals for months on end. They will not be the ones forced to live in close proximity to theirs and their fellow captives’ excrement, vomit and urine. They won’t be forced to subsist on the meager scraps of food left by their captors. But hey, that’s no problem, don’t worry, at the end of several months the ransom will eventually be negotiated down to ‘a fair price’ for your life and lives of your fellow crew members and you’ll be free to go! Never mind the 20 kilos you lost in body weight and the immeasurable psychological damage done to you, to say nothing of the fear and anxiety your family was forced to live through during your captivity. Nah mate, all they wanted was the money and that’s all been paid up so the problem is sorted. Carry on sailor…
There is of course some basic truth to the adage that money is the root of all evil. Well if not the money itself certainly the greedy pursuit of it. There is nothing whatsoever wrong with pursuing and even amassing a fortune provided one follows the rules established by the laws of man along the way. However, when laws are broken, whether in the Gulf of Aden by pirates, by executives on Wall Street or bank robbers on Main Street a civilized society must enforce consequences that discourage future breaches of the law.
I really like this issue of piracy from a PMC perspective because it is a crystal clear example of the total failure of leadership, diplomacy and partnership by state actors primarily the United States but also the rest of the key players in the UN Security Council. The ‘country’ of Somalia has been without a functioning government since 1991 and the world has done very little in the way of dealing with this problem in any effective way. What’s more there is no real action being taken as we speak so there can be little hopes for improvement in the foreseeable future. In short, the world has moved on from Somalia and were it not for these pesky and annoying pirates no one in Washington, London, Brussels or New York would give a wit about it.
And if there is no attempt being made to deal with the root cause of the problem (Somalia as a failed state) the medicine being prescribed, namely military warships, is showing itself to be impotent in the extreme at preventing attacks. By their own admission the efforts placed in the Gulf of Aden have resulted in an increase in attacks off the eastern Somali coast.
There is only one solution to cure this disease and that is to fix Somalia. But that seems to be far too difficult for anyone to contemplate. So, if you cannot or will not deal with the cause of the disease you are left only to treat the symptoms. And the solution to this is so blatantly obvious that it defies basic common sense to avoid the discussion. Everyone in the world knows the right medicine for this disease. The problem is not the medicine it is the commitment and fortitude necessary to prescribe it. And if ever two paths are rare to cross it will be the path of politicians and the paths of commitment and fortitude.
Three-outta-four ain’t bad. If the next couple of gangs of pirates finds 75% of their lot killed and the remaining 25% in custody I am betting their calculations will change a bit. However, if we continue to feel sorry for these guys and wring our hands and naval gaze and mumble about how there is really very little that can be done we will only be reinforcing the pirates’ business model and we cannot honestly be surprised when we find more of the same.
Dogs of War: Let loose the legal beagles of war
Apr 3, 2009 Commentary, David Isenberg, Dogs of War
WASHINGTON, April 3 (UPI) — Don’t look now but it is raining lawyers; or to be more precise, lawsuits. Just consider what has happened in the past two weeks.
There was a ruling on March 18 by the U.S. District Court in Virginia denying CACI’s motion to dismiss a case by four Iraqi plaintiffs alleging abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. This dates back to the original 2004 revelations made famous by the report of Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba.
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The non-profit Private Security Company
Mar 26, 2009 Commentary, Jake's Posts
By Jake Allen
One of the critiques often leveled against private security contractors is that we have the audacity to accept a pay check for our services. It’s a silly argument and one to which I have two stock responses for.
1) Most often I politely engage the usually over-educated and under-experienced antagonist remind him that he too is receiving compensation for his services and that it seems judgmental and condescending that he would begrudge me for feeding my own family through the application of skills I have spent many years to learn.
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There are only 2 kinds of contractors: trained and untrained
Mar 22, 2009 Commentary, Jake's Posts
By Jake Allen
One of the aspects that amuses me about contracting is the free-flow of people between companies and contracts. It’s not uncommon to join a project and see a number of familiar faces with whom you have a shared history even if each has worked for multiple companies in the interim. The down side of this reality is that you also see a few nardowells who probably should be either in prison or committed to an institution for lunacy or just general stupidity. How does this happen? Simply stated, it’s ‘the buddy system’ that is to blame. In this business people recruit and even promote their mates in absence of, or often worse, in violation of standing company policies.
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PMCs should be policing themselves
Mar 8, 2009 Commentary, Jake's Posts
By Jake Allen
Last week Eeben Barlow had a post in his blog titled Considering the use of a PMC or PSC. As usual Eeben’s posts are very thought provoking and this one was no different. I think he really captured the frustration many of us feel when it comes to fly-by-night PMCs or those attempting to pass themselves off as having expertise when in reality they do not possess it. Matt Loe from Feral Jundi also provided some instructive comments to Eeben’s post. Their exchange to me thinking…
There is a saying in the military that we ‘police ourselves’ The phrase and the sentiment as wide ranging application. As an officer if I ever saw something askew with newly minted Corporal I could simply find a more senior Corporal standing nearby and ask him to ‘police his own’. I could walk away knowing that the young NCO took great pride in preserving good military order and discipline. If it was in his power to
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Dogs of War: Contractors doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past
Mar 7, 2009 Commentary, David Isenberg, Dogs of War, Frequent Contributors
By DAVID ISENBERG
WASHINGTON, March 6 (UPI) — An army may travel on its stomach, but it lives to fight another day by studying its history. For the U.S. military, the study of history is not an academic pursuit but a deadly serious business. That is why there are offices like the Air Force Historical Research Agency, the Army Center for Military History, the Naval Historical Center, and the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to name a few.
Military professionals understand that the unpredictability and chaos of war make the study of the past mandatory in an effort to try to avoid repeating its disasters. Keeping and preserving detailed records is not just a bureaucratic chore but a vital mission. Militaries have always understood, long before Spanish philosopher George Santayana famously said it, that “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
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