The Combat Operator

Joint Chiefs Chairman ‘Very Positive’ After Meeting With Obama

Nov 30, 2008 Industry News, World Events

By Karen DeYoung

Washington Post Staff Writer

Sunday, November 30, 2008

Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went unarmed into his first meeting with the new commander in chief — no aides, no PowerPoint presentation, no briefing books. Summoned nine days ago to President-elect Barack Obama’s Chicago transition office, Mullen showed up with just a pad, a pen and a desire to take the measure of his incoming boss.

There was little talk of exiting Iraq or beefing up the U.S. force in Afghanistan; the one-on-one, 45-minute conversation ranged from the personal to the philosophical. Mullen came away with what he wanted: a view of the next president as a non-ideological pragmatist who was willing to both listen and lead. After the meeting, the chairman “felt very good, very positive,” according to Mullen spokesman Capt. John Kirby.

As Obama prepares to announce his national security team tomorrow, he faces a military that has long mistrusted Democrats and is particularly wary of a young, intellectual leader with no experience in uniform, who once called Iraq a “dumb” war. Military leaders have all heard his pledge to withdraw most combat forces from Iraq within 16 months — sooner than commanders on the ground have recommended — and his implied criticism of the Afghanistan war effort during the Bush administration.

But so far, Obama appears to be going out of his way to reassure them that he will do nothing rash and will seek their advice, even while making clear that he may not always take it. He has demonstrated an ability to speak the lingo, talk about “mission plans” and “tasking,” and to differentiate between strategy and tactics, a distinction Republican nominee John McCain accused him of misunderstanding during the campaign.

Obama has been careful to separate his criticism of Bush policy from his praise of the military’s valor and performance, while Michelle Obama’s public expressions of concern for military families have gone over well. But most important, according to several senior officers and civilian Pentagon officials who would speak about their incoming leader only on the condition of anonymity, is the expectation of renewed respect for the chain of command and greater realism about U.S. military goals and capabilities, which many found lacking during the Bush years.

“Open and serious debate versus ideological certitude will be a great relief to the military leaders,” said retired Maj. Gen. William L. Nash of the Council on Foreign Relations. Senior officers are aware that few in their ranks voiced misgivings over the Iraq war, but they counter that they were not encouraged to do so by the Bush White House or the Pentagon under Donald H. Rumsfeld.

“The joke was that when you leave a meeting, everybody is supposed to drink the Kool-Aid,” Nash said. “In the Bush administration, you had to drink the Kool-Aid before you got to go to the meeting.”

Obama’s expected retention of Robert M. Gates as defense secretary and expected appointment of Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton as secretary of state and retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones as national security adviser have been greeted with relief at the Pentagon.

Clinton is respected at the Pentagon and is considered a defense moderate, at times bordering on hawkish. Through her membership on the Senate Armed Services Committee — sought early in her congressional career to add gravitas to her presidential aspirations — she has developed close ties with senior military figures.

Some in the military are suspicious of “flagpole” officers such as Jones, whose assignments included Supreme Allied Commander at NATO, Marine commandant and other headquarters service, and who grew up in France and is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. But Jones also saw combat in Vietnam and served in Bosnia.

“His reputation is pretty good,” one Pentagon official said. “He’s savvy about Washington, worked the Hill,” and at a lean 6-foot-4, the former Georgetown basketball player “looks great in a suit.”

Although Jones occasionally and privately briefed candidate Obama on foreign policy matters — on Afghanistan, in particular, as did current deputy NATO commander Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry — he is not considered an intimate of the president-elect.

But as Obama’s closest national security adviser, or at least the one who will spend the most time with him, Jones is expected to follow the pattern of two military predecessors in the job, Brent Scowcroft and Colin L. Powell, who injected order and discipline to a National Security Council full of strong personalities with independent power bases.

Although exit polls did not break out active-duty voters, it is virtually certain that McCain won the military vote.

In an October survey by the Military Times, nearly 70 percent of more than 4,000 officers and enlisted respondents said they favored McCain, while about 23 percent preferred Obama. Only African American service members gave Obama a majority.

In exit polls, those who said they had “ever served in the U.S. military” made up 15 percent of voters and broke 54 percent for McCain to 44 percent for Obama. “As a culture, we are more conservative and Republican,” a senior officer said.

Obama has said he will meet with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs as well as the service chiefs during his first week in office. At the top of his agenda for that meeting will be what he has called the military’s “new mission” of planning the 16-month withdrawal timeline for Iraq. Senior officers have publicly grumbled about the risk involved.

“Moving forward in a measured way, tied to conditions as they continue to evolve, over time, is important,” Mullen said at a media briefing four days before his Nov. 21 meeting with Obama. “I’m certainly aware of what has been said” prior to the election, he said.

The last Democratic president, Bill Clinton, clashed with the chiefs during his first sit-down with them when they opposed his campaign pledge to end the ban on gays in the military. The chiefs, some of whom held the commander in chief in thinly veiled contempt as a supposed Vietnam draft dodger, won the battle, and Clinton spent much of his two terms seen as an adversary.

But Mullen came away from the Chicago talk reassured that Obama will engage in a discussion with them, balancing risks and “asking tough questions . . . but not in a combative, finger-pointing way,” one official said.

The president-elect’s invitation to Mullen, whom Obama previously had met only in passing on Capitol Hill and whose first two-year term as chairman does not expire until the end of September, was seen as an attempt to establish a relationship and avoid early conflict. While some Pentagon officials believe an Iraq withdrawal order could become Obama’s equivalent of the Clinton controversy over gays, several senior Defense Department sources said that Gates, Mullen and Gen. David H. Petraeus, head of the military’s Central Command, are untroubled by the 16-month plan and feel it can be accomplished with a month or two of wiggle room.

These sources noted that Obama himself has said he would not be “careless” about withdrawal and would retain a “residual” force of unspecified size to fight terrorists and protect U.S. diplomats and civilians. The officer most concerned about untimely withdrawal, sources said, is the Iraq commander, Gen. Ray Odierno.

Even as the Iraq war continues, defense officials are far more worried about Afghanistan, where they see policy drift and an unfocused mission. With strategy reviews now being completed at the White House and by the chairman’s office, an internal Pentagon debate is well underway over whether goals should be lowered.

Although Gen. David McKiernan, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, has requested four more U.S. combat brigades, some Pentagon strategists believe a smaller presence of Special Forces and trainers for Afghan forces — and more attention to Pakistan — is advisable.

Bush’s ideological objective of a modern Afghan democracy, several officials said, is unattainable with current U.S. resources, and there is optimism that Obama will have a more realistic view.

A number of senior officers also look with favor on Obama’s call for talks with Iran over Iraq and Afghanistan, separating those issues from U.S. demands over Tehran’s nuclear program.

One of the biggest long-term military issues on Obama’s plate will be the defense budget, currently topping 4.3 percent of gross domestic product once war expenditures are included.

Obama has said he will increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps, finding savings in the Iraq drawdown and in new scrutiny of spending, including on contractors, weapons programs and missile defense.

“They know the money is coming down,” a Pentagon official said of the uniformed services, and many welcome increased discipline.

But it’s neither the military’s nature nor its role to volunteer the cuts, the official said. “It’s for Congress and the administration to say ‘Stop it.’ “

Polling analyst Jennifer Agiesta and research editor Alice Crites contributed to this report.

Tags: Joint Chiefs, Mullen, Obama

My Husband Was a Blackwater Hero

Nov 30, 2008 Commentary

By Marybeth Laguna
Published in the Washington Post
Sunday, November 30, 2008

My husband, Art Laguna, was a hero. He was a man of honor — he kept his word and he valued truth and honesty, and he expected no less from anyone else. His life was spent in service to his country and his family.

Here at home, Art served as a sheriff’s reserve deputy. He was a volunteer helicopter pilot and flew medical evacuation missions with the California National Guard out of Sacramento ’s Mather Field. He was the father of four and grandfather of six.

Art was proud of his three-decade career with the U.S. Army and the National Guard. He served in Iraq three times and he deployed once to Bosnia. In 1998, he was awarded a medal of valor from the California Department of Corrections for piloting a National Guard helicopter that helped save a California man who’d been stranded by floodwaters on the roof of his car. And last June, the military awarded him the Legion of Merit for exceptional conduct in the performance of outstanding services and achievements. I accepted this most recent honor on his behalf.

And this past week, as our family gathered around the table to give thanks for our blessings, one very important blessing was missing. Art was killed last year in Iraq when the helicopter he was piloting was shot down while assisting a U.S. Embassy convoy that had come under fire in a violent Sunni neighborhood in central Baghdad.

Art could have chosen a safer profession. He knew that — and so did I. But from the time he was a child, all he’d ever wanted to do was to fly and to help people. At the time of his death, he was flying rescue missions into Iraq’s most dangerous areas to help evacuate teams of U.S. government employees who had come under attack.

Since the horrible day in January 2007 when the telephone rang with the news that Art had been killed, I’ve experienced the breadth of emotions that anyone feels when they lose a loved one. There’s intense pain, loss and grief. There’s pride in his accomplishments, the choices he made and the way he lived his life. And, yes, there’s anger.

My anger, however, doesn’t come from the direction you might expect. I’m not angry at Art for the risks he took in life, or at the war that took that precious life. Instead, I too often find myself operating at a slow boil, sometimes exasperated and sometimes irate at those who never knew my husband or his colleagues, yet who insist on tarnishing their memories each day.

Because when Art died, he wasn’t working for the military. He was working for Blackwater.

Art considered his job with the private security firm that protects U.S. diplomats in Iraq a continuation of his service to this country. He told me that he believed in the job and respected the mission. But somehow, this one word — Blackwater — gets in the way of a lucid, reasoned discussion.

Art first went to work for Blackwater in August 2006 and was on his second deployment with the company when he was killed. When I tell people these facts, they rarely express appreciation for his services. Instead, most suggest that he was crazy to go back. I’ve had people repeat the ridiculous urban legend that Blackwater instituted martial law in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and ask me whether Art had been a part of that. At a recent social event, someone asked me whether Blackwater was the same company that “goes around shooting people.” I’ve heard the news media and even elected officials casually throw around words such as “cowboy” and “mercenary” to describe men and women who voluntarily go into harm’s way to protect others. Those caricatures are wrong. They might describe someone’s antiwar agenda, but they don’t describe my husband or his colleagues.

This public relations spin on contractors by antiwar activists has unfortunately gained traction, and the smearing got worse after an incident in September 2007, when a Blackwater team found itself in trouble and opened fire, tragically causing the deaths of several Iraqi civilians. What I know about this comes only from the media; the company said the security guards were responding to an ambush. But when this newspaper reported that federal prosecutors had sent letters to six Blackwater Worldwide security guards involved in that incident, there was a resurgence of unfair mischaracterizations of the company and its contractors.

I don’t know the Blackwater men involved or the details of that day. But as the wife of someone who was deployed to a war zone four times, I do know that whether you’re a member of the military or a private security contractor, if you think you’re in trouble, you’re going to protect yourself. I also know that, in addition to his prior extensive military experience, Blackwater required Art to go through rigorous training before sending him to Iraq. The same was true of all his colleagues.

Our all-volunteer military is overwhelmed and doesn’t have enough soldiers with the experience it takes to guard the kinds of high-profile and highly targeted Americans who must travel around Iraq. That’s why veterans working for contractors such as Blackwater, DynCorp, Triple Canopy and others are stepping up to serve their country again.

My husband and his fellow contractors answered a call. Art didn’t do it for the money. He wanted to contribute in any way possible so that his kids and grandkids could continue to enjoy the American dream. He wanted to test himself and give back to his country using the training he’d received throughout his life.

Just like soldiers, security contractors based in Iraq face daily threats to their lives. Rather than demonizing these men and women, we should be thanking them for the essential service they provide. Whether they are working for Blackwater or directly for the U.S. military, they are all risking their lives to work for the United States. And they deserve our respect.

Marybeth Laguna lives in Sacramento.

Tags: Blackwater, contractors, Iraq, Laguna

U.S. Intelligence Focuses on Pakistani Group

Nov 29, 2008 Asia, World Events

November 29, 2008

By MARK MAZZETTI and SALMAN MASOOD of The New York Times

WASHINGTON — American intelligence and counterterrorism officials said Friday that there was mounting evidence that a Pakistani militant group based in Kashmir, most likely Lashkar-e-Taiba, was responsible for this week’s deadly attacks in Mumbai.

The officials cautioned that they had reached no firm conclusions about who was responsible for the attacks, or how they were planned and carried out. Nevertheless, they said that evidence gathered in the past two days pointed to a role for Lashkar-e-Taiba or possibly another group based in Kashmir, Jaish-e-Muhammad, which also has a track record of attacks against India.

The officials requested anonymity in describing their current thinking and declined to discuss specifics of the intelligence that they said pointed to Kashmiri militants. In the past, the American and Indian intelligence services have used communications intercepts to tie Kashmiri militants to terrorist strikes. Indian officials may also be gleaning information from at least one captured gunman who participated in the Mumbai attacks.

According to one Indian intelligence official, during the siege the militants have been using non-Indian cellphones and receiving calls from outside the country, evidence that in part led Indian officials to speak publicly about the militants’ external ties.

Lashkar-e-Taiba denied any responsibility on Thursday for the terrorist strikes. American intelligence agencies have said that the group has received some training and logistical support in the past from Pakistan’s powerful spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or I.S.I., and that Pakistan’s government has long turned a blind eye to Lashkar-e-Taiba camps in the Kashmir region, a disputed territory over which India and Pakistan have fought two wars.

Officials in Washington said Friday that there was no evidence that the Pakistani government had any role in the attacks. But if evidence were to emerge that the operation had been planned and directed from within Pakistan, that would certainly further escalate tensions between India and Pakistan, bitter, nuclear-armed rivals. It could also provoke an Indian military response, even strikes against militants’ training camps.

American and Indian officials were pursuing the possibility that the attackers arrived off the coast of Mumbai in a large ship and then boarded smaller boats before initiating their attack.

An American counterterrorism official said there was strong evidence that Lashkar-e-Taiba had a “maritime capability” and would have been able to mount the sophisticated operation in Mumbai.

Senior Bush administration officials sought to keep the tensions from boiling over on Friday by maintaining steady contact with Indian officials. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke by phone with Pranab Mukherjee, India’s foreign minister, and one of Ms. Rice’s deputies spoke with the Indian foreign secretary.

In what was seen as a sign of Pakistan’s concern about a possible Indian response, Pakistani officials announced Friday that the head of the I.S.I. would go to India to help the Indian government with its investigation. On Friday evening, however, Pakistani officials indicated that a lower-level I.S.I. representative might make the trip.

American and Indian officials have for years blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba for a campaign of violence against high-profile targets throughout India, including the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi and an August 2007 strike at an amusement park in Hyderabad. At times, Indian officials have also said Jaish-e-Muhammad was responsible for the attack on Parliament.

That attack prompted the Bush administration to try to freeze Lashkar-e-Taiba’s assets and press Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president at the time, to crack down on the group’s training operations in Pakistan.

A State Department report released this year called Lashkar-e-Taiba “one of the largest and most proficient of the Kashmiri-focused militant groups.” The report said that the group drew financing in part from Pakistani expatriates in the Middle East, and that it used a front organization called Jamaat ud-Daawa to coordinate charitable activities, like relief for the victims of the October 2006 earthquake in Kashmir.

The report said the actual size of the group was unknown, but estimated it at “several thousand” members.

Recently, some of the group’s operations have shifted from Kashmir to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and even to Afghanistan to attack American troops. American officials and terrorism experts said the group had not sent large numbers of operatives into Afghanistan, but had embedded small teams with Taliban units to gain fighting experience.

“Afghanistan is an operating war zone, so they can get active training as the Kashmir front has slowed down a bit,” said Seth Jones, a terrorism expert at the RAND Corporation.

The group is believed by experts to have at least a loose affiliation with Al Qaeda. In March 2002, a Qaeda lieutenant, Abu Zubaydah, was captured in a Lashkar-e-Taiba safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, according to the State Department report.

Lashkar-e-Taiba is not known to have singled out Westerners in past terrorist attacks, as the gunmen in Mumbai seem to have done. But one counterterrorism official said Friday that the group “has not pursued an exclusively Kashmiri agenda” and that it might certainly go after Westerners to advance broader goals.

Even as a Kashmiri connection to the attacks began to emerge on Friday, American officials said they were puzzled by some developments. For instance, they said they knew next to nothing about a group called the Deccan Mujahedeen, which issued a claim of responsibility for the attacks.

Terrorism experts have said there is no evidence of that group’s involvement in past strikes, and they speculated that another group fabricated the name to mask responsibility.

Salman Masood contributed reporting from Islamabad, Pakistan, Souad Mekhennet from Frankfurt, and William K. Rashbaum from New York.

Tags: Mumbai, Pakistan, terrorism

High-Seas Pirates increasingly working with Jihadis

Nov 28, 2008 Africa, Industry News, World Events

By Maj. W. Thomas Smith Jr.

Originally Published in Middle East Times

They are hardly the bejeweled, Jolly Roger flying buccaneers we’ve come to associate with of the Golden Age of Piracy (1692-1725). But 21^st century pirates operating on the high seas are every bit as dangerous as their romanticized forebears. They are far more tech savvy. And experts contend they may be increasingly coordinating efforts with Islamist terrorists, particularly those pirates operating in the Indian Ocean off the east African coast of Somalia and in the heavily trafficked Gulf of Aden.

In the December 2008 issue of Armed Forces Journal, Peter Brookes, a former CIA operations officer who also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, writes: ‘While maritime terrorism and piracy aren’t the same, they could overlap, especially when it comes to targets and techniques, providing opportunities for collaboration.’”

Dominick Donald, chief analyst for London-based Aegis Defense Services, agrees. “Al Shabaab [a Somalia-based, Al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization so-designated by the U.S. State Department] is at least tolerating piracy, and may be doing more,” Donald said Monday during a panel discussion on piracy hosted by the Washington, D.C.-based Heritage Foundation.

J. Peter Pham – also on the panel, but in an exclusive conversation with MIDDLE EAST TIMES – says that, to date, Islamists in Somalia like Al Shabaab may not yet be “directly involved” in acts of piracy. “But we do know they [the Islamists] have received money from the pirates in exchange for looking the other way when it comes to pirate activities, and for allowing the pirates to bring hijacked vessels into ports like Kismayo which the Islamists control.”

Pham, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, adds, pirates have “done favors for the terrorists like bringing in weapons and materiel and foreign Jihadists into Somalia.” And evidence cited by more than one analyst indicates the Islamists in Somalia have been paid to provide training in both weapons and tactics to the pirates.

“Both pirates and Islamists are clearly benefiting from one another,” Pham says. “Not only is money changing hands, but the Islamists are piggy-backing on the pirates’ ability to travel at sea.”

Pham refers to this collaboration as “a tactical alliance,” and says “an operational alliance” may be forthcoming. At the very least, the Islamists – with pirate assistance – may be developing a maritime capability.

“Some analysts point to credible intelligence indicating Al Shabaab is developing a maritime capacity similar to the maritime capacity that the Tamil Tigers had off Sri Lanka,” says Pham. “If that happens, it will be a major deterioration of the situation.”

The most recent statistics (released Oct. 2008) by the International Maritime Bureau indicate nearly 200 reported incidents of piracy worldwide—with Somalia, Nigeria, and Indonesia being the top-three hotspots respectively—from Jan. through Sept. 2008. Those same statistics show 63 attacks off Somalia. Attacks since increase the numbers to nearly 100 ships attacked off Somalia this year, including 39 ships hijacked and at least 17 still in the hands of pirates.

The problem for naval forces tasked with combating pirates is three-fold.

First: counterpiracy efforts often take a back seat to more pressing concerns on the high seas. Navies in 2008 already have their hands full with global counterterrorism operations and – in the case of the U.S. Navy – ongoing sealift ops, as well as the monitoring of the exercises and operations of other navies.

Second: the oceans cover over 70 percent of the earth. Sixty percent of those oceans are the vast free-to-roam international waters, and pirates are extending their reach farther out into those waters.

Third: modern-day pirates—operating in speedboats launched from remote bases or motherships (seized and converted freighters)—are almost always well-equipped with GPS receivers, computers, satellite phones, rangefinders and powerful telescopes, light and heavy machineguns, and rocket-propelled grenades; basically the same technology available to terrorists.

And the consensus among experts like Pham is that “it’s going to get worse before it gets better.”

Tags: Piracy, pirates, securi, Somalia

A Necessary Evil

Nov 27, 2008 Commentary

Written by Adam Ryan and published at his blog Politically Blue Collar

From the start of the war in Iraq there has been a detailed media coverage that is unparalleled compared to past conflicts. With this increased exposure many different aspects of war have been brought to the public’s ever judging eye that might not have ever existed before, mainly the use of contractors and most controversially armed contractors. You might ask, what is a contractor? Well in regards to the Iraq War it is any individual or company that is hired to do a specific job for the military. Many people question why we use these companies to fulfill jobs that some might consider a responsibility of the military. The reason is two fold, cost and man power.

The end of the Cold War brought about a dramatic downsize of America’s military. This reduction of both manpower and funds is not particularly hurtful especially during peace times, however it is very noticeable in the way the military operates during a conflict. Because of the scale of the Iraq War and the decrease in manpower the military has to rely more on the private sector more than ever before. The military has hired companies, most notable Halliburton and KBR, to fulfill roles for the troops that do not require a service member such as preparing meals, washing clothes, and other basic duties. With these types of roles taken care of the military can utilize its troops more productively.

The most controversial aspect of all this contract work is the armed contractors and Private Military Companies (PMC). Many people believe these contractors to be mercenaries doing America’s dirty work; this could not be further from the truth. In reality these individuals are just armed security guards. With the rebuilding of Iraq comes lots of things that need protection. Iraq is still an extremely dangerous place where anything can happen, everything from supplies to businessmen needs security. This is where the cost aspect comes in. It is very expensive for the U.S. military to send an armed convoy along with every truck full of gravel to rebuild something. With every soldier comes a whole network of logistics and support. The average cost of one soldier in Iraq for one year is $390,000. It is way cheaper to hire a company such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy, Aegis, or any of the other PMC’s to perform these security roles. Soldiers are trained to do many different things and it would be a waste of a precious resource to send them on security convoys everyday, especially while you have these PMC’s that specially trains their employees for convoy and VIP security.

I do realize that there is a lot of ongoing controversy as to whether these contract companies are making too much money off the Iraq War. I am not debating that, how ever I do believe that they serve a very necessary role and free up a lot of soldiers to do more important work.

Tags: contractors, mercenary

Contractors: The New Element of Military Force Structure

Nov 27, 2008 Industry News

Written by MARK CANCIAN and published in Parameters,  Autumn 2008, pp. 61-77.

 

Mercenaries,” “merchants of death,” “coalition of the billing,” “a national disgrace” all have been used to describe the use of contractors in war. The extensive use of contractors on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan has engendered strong emotion and calls for change. An ever-expanding literature and much larger volume of opinion pieces have led the discussion, most expressing shock and disappointment that such a situation has occurred. Unfortunately, little of this literature is useful to planners trying to design future forces in a world characterized by extensive commitments and limited manpower. The purpose of this article is to examine what battlefield contractors actually do, consider how we got to the situation we are in today, and provide force planners with some useful insight regarding the future.

Some general conclusions related to this assessment:

    •  Most jobs performed by contractors on the battlefield are unobjectional and should not be done by military personnel.

    •  With regard to the provision for bodyguards, the function where the most problems have occurred, viable options for change do exist.

    •  Following the Cold War, the Services, especially the active Army, were structured with an emphasis on combat units at the expense of support units. As a result there is a large and enduring shortage of support units. The use of contractors on the battlefield is no longer an optional or marginal activity.

The bottom-line for planners is that contractors are an integral and permanent part of US force structure. As a permanent part of US military force structure, contractors should be treated as such. Just as there are plans, preparations, and procedures for using reserve forces, the same needs to be done in the case of contractors.

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Tags: Cancian, contractors, mercenary, warfare

Merchant ships may arm against pirates

Nov 27, 2008 Africa, Industry News, World Events

By Tom Mooney

Staff Writer at The Providence Journal www.projo.com

They shoot pirates, don’t they?

Not yet, but merchant ships off the coast of Somalia may soon resort to hiring gunmen to stop the brazen seizure of vessels, predicts Nikola Gvosdev, who teachers national security studies at the Naval War College in Newport.

Gvosdev, who has made appearances recently on MSNBC and National Public Radio, says most shipping companies have avoided hiring armed security forces up until now “because of the expense, the hassle and the insurance liability of having armed guards aboard.”

But as piracy blossoms into an international crisis, expanding into the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, ship owners are considering the lethal option.

“The problem you still run into is security onboard. A lot of pirates are successful in stealth. You get a dozen pirates on board and then you have a fight. Until now, while you have had the attacks, you haven’t had much in the loss of life,” he says. “But then, if you get pirates on board and start a gun battle, you may now have additional dead sailors.”

“On the other hand, the evidence shows that if the pirates see a vessel that has armed security — if they fire warning shots or otherwise show they will use lethal measures — the pirates don’t board. They are opportunistic in their choice of targets.”

Somalia, an impoverished nation on the east coast of Africa, has not had a functioning government since 1991. There have been at least 96 pirate attacks so far this year in Somali waters, with 40 ships hijacked. Fifteen ships with nearly 300 crew are still in the hands of Somali pirates, who dock the hijacked vessels near the eastern and southern coast as they negotiate for ransom. In just the last two weeks pirates have seized eight vessels including a huge Saudi supertanker loaded with $100 million worth of crude oil.

Ten to 15 years ago, the pirates were simple Somali fishermen. After their government failed in 1991, Gvosdev says the fishermen were left to themselves to protect their fishing grounds from illegal fishing vessels from Japan, China, France and Spain.

The fishermen hired local armed militants to drive off the poachers and, eventually, “the situation spiraled up,” Gvosdev says. “They started thinking: ‘We can hold up one of these fishing vessels.’ The targets started getting bigger and more attractive and the ransoms started coming in. The fishermen said, ‘Hey this works.’ ”

The merchant companies’ acquiescence to pay ransoms to free their ships and crew has helped create a growing cyclical problem, he says.

“There’s a sense that it’s a business that works, so more people have been joining in.”

A British reporter who entered one of the Somali coastal villages, Gvosdev says, learned that the piracy trade is well organized among criminal leaders who divide up the ransom money and set a percentage aside for improved equipment, such as better radios, GPS systems, boats and guns.

“Therefore, by paying the ransom, you’re also enabling them to increase their capabilities to launch further attacks.”

Shipping officials from around the world have called for a military blockade along Somalia’s coast to intercept pirate vessels heading out to sea. The head of the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, representing most of the world fleet, said Monday that stronger naval action — including aerial support — is necessary to battle rampant piracy in the Gulf of Aden near Somalia.

But NATO, which has four warships off the coast of Somalia, has rejected a blockade.

U.S. Gen. John Craddock, NATO’s supreme allied commander, said the alliance’s mandate is solely to escort World Food Program ships to Somalia and to conduct anti-piracy patrols. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that a blockade of ports was “not contemplated by NATO.”

In neighboring Kenya, the head of U.S. military operations in Africa said he had no evidence that Somali pirates are connected to al-Qaida, but said the allegations are “a concern we all would have.”

Western governments have expressed concern that some pirate ransoms — some $30 million this year alone — could end up in the hands of extremists with links to terror groups in Somalia.

Gvosdev doesn’t believe a blockade or a “land invasion,” as suggested by some countries, has the wide support to be politically feasible.

In the end, Gvosdev says, employing the pirates the same way the U.S. government paid insurgents in Iraq to join their side may be the best option: “For a lot of these people, the bottom line is: ‘Will I get paid at the end of the day?’ ”

Tags: Africa, Piracy, pirates, Somalia

Now What? I like the new SOFA; Just hear me out…

Nov 25, 2008 Industry News, Iraq, Jake's Posts

Part 2 of the Now What? Series  

 

By: Jake Allen at The Combat Operator

25 November 2008

In Part 1 of this series TCO promised to address three recent and ongoing events that will directly affect operators in Iraq.  As a review, those three events are:

• America’s election of Barack Obama
• The continuing global economic crisis
• The ability of the Iraqi government to find their feet

Obama’s transition team continue to fire out cabinet post announcements at the sustained rate.  So far he has chosen to focus, rightly in our view, mainly on the U.S. domestic economic situation.  He has indicated that he will move on to his foreign policy announcements next week so we will reserve comment until those are released and make that Part 3 of the series. 

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Tags: Iraq, Now What, SOFA

Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) U.S./Iraq

Nov 24, 2008 Industry News, Iraq, World Events

Agreement

Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq

On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq

 

Preamble

 

The United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, referred to hereafter as “the Parties”:

 

Recognizing the importance of: strengthening their joint security, contributing to world peace and stability, combating terrorism in Iraq, and cooperating in the security and defense spheres, thereby deterring aggression and threats against the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iraq and against its democratic, federal, and constitutional system;

 

Affirming that such cooperation is based on full respect for the sovereignty of each of them in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter;

 

Out of a desire to reach a common understanding that strengthens cooperation between them;

 

Without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its territory, waters, and airspace; and

 

Pursuant to joint undertakings as two sovereign, independent, and coequal countries;

 

Have agreed to the following:

 

 

Article 1

Scope and Purpose

 

This Agreement shall determine the principal provisions and requirements that regulate the temporary presence, activities, and withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq.

 

 

Article 2

Definition of Terms

 

1.   “Agreed facilities and areas” are those Iraqi facilities and areas owned by the Government of Iraq that are in use by the United States Forces during the period in which this Agreement is in force. 

 

2.  “United States Forces” means the entity comprising the members of the United States Armed Forces, their associated civilian component, and all property, equipment, and materiel of the United States Armed Forces present in the territory of Iraq.

 

3.  “Member of the United States Forces” means any individual who is a member of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard.

 

4.  “Member of the civilian component” means any civilian employed by the United States Department of Defense.  This term does not include individuals normally resident in Iraq.

 

5.  “United States contractors” and “United States contractor employees” mean non-Iraqi persons or legal entities, and their employees, who are citizens of the United States or a third country and who are in Iraq to supply goods, services, and security in Iraq to or on behalf of the United States Forces under a contract or subcontract with or for the United States Forces.  However, the terms do not include persons or legal entities normally resident in the territory of Iraq.

 

6.  “Official vehicles” means commercial vehicles that may be modified for security purposes and are basically designed for movement on various roads and designated for transportation of personnel. 

 

7.  “Military vehicles” means all types of vehicles used by the United States Forces, which were originally designated for use in combat operations and display special distinguishing numbers and symbols according to applicable United States Forces instructions and regulations.

 

8.  “Defense equipment” means systems, weapons, supplies, equipment, munitions, and materials exclusively used in conventional warfare that are required by the United States Forces in connection with agreed activities under this Agreement and are not related, either directly or indirectly, to systems of weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological weapons, and related waste of such weapons).

 

9.  “Storage” means the keeping of defense equipment required by the United States Forces in connection with agreed activities under this Agreement.

 

10.  “Taxes and duties” means all taxes, duties (including customs duties), fees, of whatever kind, imposed by the Government of Iraq, or its agencies, or governorates under Iraqi laws and regulations.  However, the term does not include charges by the Government of Iraq, its agencies, or governorates for services requested and received by the United States Forces.

 

 

Article 3

Laws

 

1.  While conducting military operations pursuant to this Agreement, it is the duty of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component to respect Iraqi laws, customs, traditions, and conventions and to refrain from any activities that are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of this Agreement.  It is the duty of the United States to take all necessary measures for this purpose.

 

2.    With the exception of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, the United States Forces may not transfer any person into or out of Iraq on vehicles, vessels, or aircraft covered by this Agreement, unless in accordance with applicable Iraqi laws and regulations, including implementing arrangements as may be agreed to by the Government of Iraq.

 

 

Article 4

Missions

1.  The Government of Iraq requests the temporary assistance of the United States Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain security and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of operations against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former regime.

 

2.  All such military operations that are carried out pursuant to this Agreement shall be conducted with the agreement of the Government of Iraq.   Such operations shall be fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities.  The coordination of all such military operations shall be overseen by a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC) to be established pursuant to this Agreement.  Issues regarding proposed military operations that cannot be resolved by the JMOCC shall be forwarded to the Joint Ministerial Committee.

 

3.  All such operations shall be conducted with full respect for the Iraqi Constitution and the laws of Iraq.  Execution of such operations shall not infringe upon the sovereignty of Iraq and its national interests, as defined by the Government of Iraq.  It is the duty of the United States Forces to respect the laws, customs, and traditions of Iraq and applicable international law. 

 

4.  The Parties shall continue their efforts to cooperate to strengthen Iraq’s security capabilities including, as may be mutually agreed, on training, equipping, supporting, supplying, and establishing and upgrading logistical systems, including transportation, housing, and supplies for Iraqi Security Forces.

 

5.  The Parties retain the right to legitimate self defense within Iraq, as defined in applicable international law.

 

Article 5

Property Ownership

1.  Iraq owns all buildings, non-relocatable structures, and assemblies connected to the soil that exist on agreed facilities and areas, including those that are used, constructed, altered, or improved by the United States Forces.

2.  Upon their withdrawal, the United States Forces shall return to the Government of Iraq all the facilities and areas provided for the use of the combat forces of the United States, based on two lists.  The first list of agreed facilities and areas shall take effect upon the entry into force of the Agreement.  The second list shall take effect no later than June 30, 2009, the date for the withdrawal of combat forces from the cities, villages, and localities.  The Government of Iraq may agree to allow the United States Forces the use of some necessary facilities for the purposes of this Agreement on withdrawal.

 

3.  The United States shall bear all costs for construction, alterations, or improvements in the agreed facilities and areas provided for its exclusive use.  The United States Forces shall consult with the Government of Iraq regarding such construction, alterations, and improvements, and must seek approval of the Government of Iraq for major construction and alteration projects.   In the event that the use of agreed facilities and areas is shared, the two Parties shall bear the costs of construction, alterations, or improvements proportionately. 

 

4.  The United States shall be responsible for paying the costs for services requested and received in the agreed facilities and areas exclusively used by it, and both Parties shall be proportionally responsible for paying the costs for services requested and received in joint agreed facilities and areas.

 

5.  Upon the discovery of any historical or cultural site or finding any strategic resource in agreed facilities and areas, all works of construction, upgrading, or modification shall cease immediately and the Iraqi representatives at the Joint Committee shall be notified to determine appropriate steps in that regard.

6.  The United States shall return agreed facilities and areas and any non-relocatable structures and assemblies on them that it had built, installed, or established during the term of this Agreement, according to mechanisms and priorities set forth by the Joint Committee.  Such facilities and areas shall be handed over to the Government of Iraq free of any debts and financial burdens.

7.  The United States Forces shall return to the Government of Iraq the agreed facilities and areas that have heritage, moral, and political significance and any non-relocatable structures and assemblies on them that it had built, installed, or established, according to mechanisms, priorities, and a time period as mutually agreed by the Joint Committee, free of any debts or financial burdens. 

 

8.  The United States Forces shall return the agreed facilities and areas to the Government of Iraq upon the expiration or termination of this Agreement, or earlier as mutually agreed by the Parties, or when such facilities are no longer required as determined by the JMOCC, free of any debts or financial burdens.

 

9.  The United States Forces and United States contractors shall retain title to all equipment, materials, supplies, relocatable structures, and other movable property that was legitimately imported into or legitimately acquired within the territory of Iraq in connection with this Agreement.

 

 

Article 6

Use of Agreed Facilities and Areas

 

1.  With full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq, and as part of exchanging views between the Parties pursuant to this Agreement, Iraq grants access and use of agreed facilities and areas to the United States Forces, United States contractors, United States contractor employees, and other individuals or entities as agreed upon by the Parties. 

 

2.  In accordance with this Agreement, Iraq authorizes the United States Forces to exercise within the agreed facilities and areas all rights and powers that may be necessary to establish, use, maintain, and secure such agreed facilities and areas.  The Parties shall coordinate and cooperate regarding exercising these rights and powers in the agreed facilities and areas of joint use.

 

3.  The United States Forces shall assume control of entry to agreed facilities and areas that have been provided for its exclusive use.  The Parties shall coordinate the control of entry into agreed facilities and areas for joint use and in accordance with mechanisms set forth by the JMOCC.  The Parties shall coordinate guard duties in areas adjacent to agreed facilities and areas through the JMOCC.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Article 7

Positioning and Storage of Defense Equipment

The United States Forces may place within agreed facilities and areas and in other temporary locations agreed upon by the Parties defense equipment, supplies, and materials that are required by the United States Forces in connection with agreed activities under this Agreement.  The use and storage of such equipment shall be proportionate to the temporary missions of the United States Forces in Iraq pursuant to Article 4 of this Agreement and shall not be related, either directly or indirectly, to systems of weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological weapons, and related waste of such weapons).  The United States Forces shall control the use and relocation of defense equipment that they own and are stored in Iraq.  The United States Forces shall ensure that no storage depots for explosives or munitions are near residential areas, and they shall remove such materials stored therein.  The United States shall provide the Government of Iraq with essential information on the numbers and types of such stocks.

 

 

Article 8

Protecting the Environment

Both Parties shall implement this Agreement in a manner consistent with protecting the natural environment and human health and safety.  The United States reaffirms its commitment to respecting applicable Iraqi environmental laws, regulations, and standards in the course of executing its policies for the purposes of implementing this Agreement. 

 

 

Article 9

Movement of Vehicles, Vessels, and Aircraft

1.  With full respect for the relevant rules of land and maritime safety and movement, vessels and vehicles operated by or at the time exclusively for the United States Forces may enter, exit, and move within the territory of Iraq for the purposes of implementing this Agreement.  The JMOCC shall develop appropriate procedures and rules to facilitate and regulate the movement of vehicles.

2.  With full respect for relevant rules of safety in aviation and air navigation, United States Government aircraft and civil aircraft that are at the time operating exclusively under a contract with the United States Department of Defense are authorized to over-fly, conduct airborne refueling exclusively for the purposes of implementing this Agreement over, and land and take off within, the territory of Iraq for the purposes of implementing this Agreement. The Iraqi authorities shall grant the aforementioned aircraft permission every year to land in and take off from Iraqi territory exclusively for the purposes of implementing this Agreement.  United States Government aircraft and civil aircraft that are at the time operating exclusively under a contract with the United States Department of Defense, vessels, and vehicles shall not have any party boarding them without the consent of the authorities of the United States Forces.  The Joint Sub-Committee concerned with this matter shall take appropriate action to facilitate the regulation of such traffic.

3.  Surveillance and control over Iraqi airspace shall transfer to Iraqi authority immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement.

 

4.  Iraq may request from the United States Forces temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of surveillance and control of Iraqi air space.

 

5.  United States Government aircraft and civil aircraft that are at the time operating exclusively under contract to the United States Department of Defense shall not be subject to payment of any taxes, duties, fees, or similar charges, including overflight or navigation fees, landing, and parking fees at government airfields.  Vehicles and vessels owned or operated by or at the time exclusively for the United States Forces shall not be subject to payment of any taxes, duties, fees, or similar charges, including for vessels at government ports.  Such vehicles, vessels, and aircraft shall be free from registration requirements within Iraq.

 

6.  The United States Forces shall pay fees for services requested and received. 

 
7.  Each Party shall provide the other with maps and other available information on the location of mine fields and other obstacles that can hamper or jeopardize movement within the territory and waters of Iraq.

 

Article 10

Contracting Procedures

 
The United States Forces may select contractors and enter into contracts in accordance with United States law for the purchase of materials and services in Iraq, including services of construction and building.  The United States Forces shall contract with Iraqi suppliers of materials and services to the extent feasible when their bids are competitive and constitute best value.  The United States Forces shall respect Iraqi law when contracting with Iraqi suppliers and contractors and shall provide Iraqi authorities with the names of Iraqi suppliers and contractors, and the amounts of relevant contracts.

 

 

Article 11
Services and Communications

 

1.  The United States Forces may produce and provide water, electricity, and other services to agreed facilities and areas in coordination with the Iraqi authorities through the Joint Sub-Committee concerned with this matter.

 
2.  The Government of Iraq owns all frequencies.  Pertinent Iraqi authorities shall allocate to the United States Forces such frequencies as coordinated by both Parties through the JMOCC.  The United States Forces shall return frequencies allocated to them at the end of their use not later than the termination of this Agreement.

3. The United States Forces shall operate their own telecommunications systems in a manner that fully respects the Constitution and laws of Iraq and in accordance with the definition of the term “telecommunications” contained in the Constitution of the International Union of Telecommunications of 1992, including the right to use necessary means and services of their own systems to ensure the full capability to operate systems of telecommunications.

 
4.  For the purposes of this Agreement, the United States Forces are exempt from the payment of fees to use transmission airwaves and existing and future frequencies, including any administrative fees or any other related charges.

 
5.  The United States Forces must obtain the consent of the Government of Iraq regarding any projects of infrastructure for communications that are made outside agreed facilities and areas exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement in accordance with Article 4, except in the case of actual combat operations conducted pursuant to Article 4.

 

6.  The United States Forces shall use telecommunications systems exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement.

 

Article 12
Jurisdiction

 

Recognizing Iraq’s sovereign right to determine and enforce the rules of criminal and civil law in its territory, in light of Iraq’s request for temporary assistance from the United States Forces set forth in Article 4, and consistent with the duty of the members of the United States Forces and the civilian component to respect Iraqi laws, customs, traditions, and conventions, the Parties have agreed as follows:

 

1.     Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component for the grave premeditated felonies enumerated pursuant to paragraph 8, when such crimes are committed outside agreed facilities and areas and outside duty status.

 

2.      Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States contractors and United States contractor employees.

 

3.     The United States shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component for matters arising inside agreed facilities and areas; during duty status outside agreed facilities and areas; and in circumstances not covered by paragraph 1. 

 

4.     At the request of either Party, the Parties shall assist each other in the investigation of incidents and the collection and exchange of evidence to ensure the due course of justice.

 

5.     Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component arrested or detained by Iraqi authorities shall be notified immediately to United States Forces authorities and handed over to them within 24 hours from the time of detention or arrest.  Where Iraq exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, custody of an accused member of the United States Forces or of the civilian component shall reside with United States Forces authorities.  United States Forces authorities shall make such accused persons available to the Iraqi authorities for purposes of investigation and trial.

 

6.      The authorities of either Party may request the authorities of the other Party to waive its primary right to jurisdiction in a particular case.  The Government of Iraq agrees to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph 1 above, only after it has determined and notifies the United States in writing within 21 days of the discovery of an alleged offense, that it is of particular importance that such jurisdiction be exercised.

 

7. Where the United States exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component shall be entitled to due process standards and protections pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States.  Where the offense arising under paragraph 3 of this Article may involve a victim who is not a member of the United States Forces or of the civilian component, the Parties shall establish procedures through the Joint Committee to keep such persons informed as appropriate of: the status of the investigation of the crime; the bringing of charges against a suspected offender; the scheduling of court proceedings and the results of plea negotiations; opportunity to be heard at public sentencing proceedings, and to confer with the attorney for the prosecution in the case; and, assistance with filing a claim under Article 21 of this Agreement.  As mutually agreed by the Parties, United States Forces authorities shall seek to hold the trials of such cases inside Iraq.  If the trial of such cases is to be conducted in the United States, efforts will be undertaken to facilitate the personal attendance of the victim at the trial. 

 

8. Where Iraq exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component shall be entitled to due process standards and protections consistent with those available under United States and Iraqi law.  The Joint Committee shall establish procedures and mechanisms for implementing this Article, including an enumeration of the grave premeditated felonies that are subject to paragraph 1 and procedures that meet such due process standards and protections.  Any exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article may proceed only in accordance with these procedures and mechanisms.

 

9.  Pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, United States Forces authorities shall certify whether an alleged offense arose during duty status.  In those cases where Iraqi authorities believe the circumstances require a review of this determination, the Parties shall consult immediately through the Joint Committee, and United States Forces authorities shall take full account of the facts and circumstances and any information Iraqi authorities may present bearing on the determination by United States Forces authorities.

 

10.  The Parties shall review the provisions of this Article every 6 months including by considering any proposed amendments to this Article taking into account the security situation in Iraq, the extent to which the United States Forces in Iraq are engaged in military operations, the growth and development of the Iraqi judicial system, and changes in United States and Iraqi law.

 

 

Article 13

Carrying Weapons and Apparel

 

Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may possess and carry weapons that are owned by the United States while in Iraq according to the authority granted to them under orders and according to their requirements and duties.  Members of the United States Forces may also wear uniforms during duty in Iraq.

 

 

Article 14

Entry and Exit

 

1.  For purposes of this Agreement, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may enter and leave Iraq through official places of embarkation and debarkation requiring only identification cards and travel orders issued for them by the United States.  The Joint Committee shall assume the task of setting up a mechanism and a process of verification to be carried out by pertinent Iraqi authorities.

 

2.  Iraqi authorities shall have the right to inspect and verify the lists of names of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component entering and leaving Iraq directly through the agreed facilities and areas.  Said lists shall be submitted to Iraqi authorities by the United States Forces.  For purposes of this Agreement, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may enter and leave Iraq through agreed facilities and areas requiring only identification cards issued for them by the United States.  The Joint Committee shall assume the task of setting up a mechanism and a process for inspecting and verifying the validity of these documents.

 

 

Article 15

Import and Export

 

1.  For the exclusive purposes of implementing this Agreement,  the United States Forces and United States contractors may import, export (items bought in Iraq), re-export, transport, and use in Iraq any equipment, supplies, materials, and technology, provided that the materials imported or brought in by them are not banned in Iraq as of the date this Agreement enters into force.  The importation, re-exportation, transportation, and use of such items shall not be subject to any inspections, licenses, or other restrictions, taxes, customs duties, or any other charges imposed in Iraq, as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10.  United States Forces authorities shall provide to relevant Iraqi authorities an appropriate certification that such items are being imported by the United States Forces or United States contractors for use by the United States Forces exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement.  Based on security information that becomes available, Iraqi authorities have the right to request the United States Forces to open in their presence any container in which such items are being imported in order to verify its contents.  In making such a request, Iraqi authorities shall honor the security requirements of the United States Forces and, if requested to do so by the United States Forces, shall make such verifications in facilities used by the United States Forces.  The exportation of Iraqi goods by the United States Forces and United States contractors shall not be subject to inspections or any restrictions other than licensing requirements.  The Joint Committee shall work with the Iraqi Ministry of Trade to expedite license requirements consistent with Iraqi law for the export of goods purchased in Iraq by the United States Forces for the purposes of this Agreement.  Iraq has the right to demand review of any issues arising out of this paragraph.  The Parties shall consult immediately in such cases through the Joint Committee or, if necessary, the Joint Ministerial Committee.

 

2.  Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may import into Iraq, re-export, and use personal effect materials and equipment for consumption or personal use.  The import into, re-export from, transfer from, and use of such imported items in Iraq shall not be subjected to licenses, other restrictions, taxes, custom duties, or any other charges imposed in Iraq, as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10.  The imported quantities shall be reasonable and proportionate to personal use.  United States Forces authorities will take measures to ensure that no items or material of cultural or historic significance to Iraq are being exported.

 

3.  Any inspections of materials pursuant to paragraph 2 by Iraqi authorities must be done urgently in an agreed upon place and according to procedures established by the Joint Committee.

 

4.  Any material imported free of customs and fees in accordance with this Agreement shall be subjected to taxes and customs and fees as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10, or any other fees valued at the time of sale in Iraq, upon sale to individuals and entities not covered by tax exemption or special import privileges.  Such taxes and fees (including custom duties) shall be paid by the transferee for the items sold.

 

5.  Materials referred to in the paragraphs of this Article must not be imported or used for commercial purposes.

 

 

Article 16

Taxes

 

1.  Any taxes, duties, or fees as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10, with their value determined and imposed in the territory of Iraq, shall not be imposed on goods and services purchased by or on behalf of the United States Forces in Iraq for official use or on goods and services that have been purchased in Iraq on behalf of the United States Forces.

 

2.  Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component shall not be responsible for payment of any tax, duty, or fee that has its value determined and imposed in the territory of Iraq, unless in return for services requested and received.

 

 

Article 17
Licenses or Permits

 
1.  Valid driver’s licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, and to United States contractor employees, shall be deemed acceptable to Iraqi authorities.  Such license holders shall not be subject to a test or fee for operating the vehicles, vessels, and aircraft belonging to the United States Forces in Iraq.

2.  Valid driver’s licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, and to United States contractor employees, to operate personal cars within the territory of Iraq shall be deemed acceptable to Iraqi authorities.  License holders shall not be subject to a test or fee.

 

3.  All professional licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, and to United States contractor employees shall be deemed valid by Iraqi authorities, provided such licenses are related to the services they provide within the framework of performing their official duties for or contracts in support of the United States Forces, members of the civilian component, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees, according to terms agreed upon by the Parties.

 

 

Article 18

Official and Military Vehicles

1.  Official vehicles shall display official Iraqi license plates to be agreed upon between the Parties.  Iraqi authorities shall, at the request of the authorities of the United States Forces, issue registration plates for official vehicles of the United States Forces without fees, according to procedures used for the Iraqi Armed Forces.  The authorities of the United States Forces shall pay to Iraqi authorities the cost of such plates.

 
2.  Valid registration and licenses issued by United States authorities for official vehicles of the United States Forces shall be deemed acceptable by Iraqi authorities.

3.  Military vehicles exclusively used by the United States Forces will be exempted from the requirements of registration and licenses, and they shall be clearly marked with numbers on such vehicles.

 

Article 19

Support Activities Services

 

1.  The United States Forces, or others acting on behalf of the United States Forces, may assume the duties of establishing and administering activities and entities inside agreed facilities and areas, through which they can provide services for members of the United States Forces, the civilian component, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees.  These entities and activities include military post offices; financial services; shops selling food items, medicine, and other commodities and services; and various areas to provide entertainment and telecommunications services, including radio broadcasts.  The establishment of such services does not require permits.

2.  Broadcasting, media, and entertainment services that reach beyond the scope of the agreed facilities and areas shall be subject to Iraqi laws.

3.  Access to the Support Activities Services shall be limited to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, United States contractors, United States contractor employees, and other persons and entities that are agreed upon.  The authorities of the United States Forces shall take appropriate actions to prevent misuse of the services provided by the mentioned activities, and prevent the sale or resale of aforementioned goods and services to persons not authorized access to these entities or to benefit from their services.  The United States Forces will determine broadcasting and television programs to authorized recipients.

4.  The service support entities and activities referred to in this Article shall be granted the same financial and customs exemptions granted to the United States Forces, including exemptions guaranteed in Articles 15 and 16 of this Agreement.  These entities and activities that offer services shall be operated and managed in accordance with United States regulations; these entities and activities shall not be obligated to collect nor pay taxes or other fees related to the activities in connection with their operations.

 

5.  The mail sent through the military post service shall be certified by United States Forces authorities and shall be exempt from inspection, search, and seizure by Iraqi authorities, except for non-official mail that may be subject to electronic observation.  Questions arising in the course of implementation of this paragraph shall be addressed by the concerned Joint Sub-Committee and resolved by mutual agreement.  The concerned Joint Sub-Committee shall periodically inspect the mechanisms by which the United States Forces authorities certify military mail.

 

 

Article 20

Currency and foreign exchange

 

1.  The United States Forces shall have the right to use any amount of cash in United States currency or financial instruments with a designated value in United States currency exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement.  Use of Iraqi currency and special banks by the United States Forces shall be in accordance with Iraqi laws.

 

2.  The United States Forces may not export Iraqi currency from Iraq, and shall take measures to ensure that members of the United States Forces, of the civilian component, and United States contractors and United States contractor employees do not export Iraqi currency from Iraq.

 

 

Article 21

Claims

 

1.  With the exception of claims arising from contracts, each Party shall waive the right to claim compensation against the other Party for any damage, loss, or destruction of property, or compensation for injuries or deaths that could happen to members of the force or civilian component of either Party arising out of the performance of their official duties in Iraq.

 

2.  United States Forces authorities shall pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of meritorious third party claims arising out of acts, omissions, or negligence of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component done in the performance of their official duties and incident to the non-combat activities of the United States Forces.   United States Forces authorities may also settle meritorious claims not arising from the performance of official duties.  All claims in this paragraph shall be settled expeditiously in accordance with the laws and regulations of the United States.  In settling claims, United States Forces authorities shall take into account any report of investigation or opinion regarding liability or amount of damages issued by Iraqi authorities.

 

3.    Upon the request of either Party, the Parties shall consult immediately through the Joint Committee or, if necessary, the Joint Ministerial Committee, where issues referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above require review.

 

 

Article 22

Detention

 

1.  No detention or arrest may be carried out by the United States Forces (except with respect to detention or arrest of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component) except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law and pursuant to Article 4.

 

2.  In the event the United States Forces detain or arrest persons as authorized by this Agreement or Iraqi law, such persons must be handed over to competent Iraqi authorities within 24 hours from the time of their detention or arrest.

 

3.  The Iraqi authorities may request assistance from the United States Forces in detaining or arresting wanted individuals.

 

4.  Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the United States Forces shall provide to the Government of Iraq available information on all detainees who are being held by them.  Competent Iraqi authorities shall issue arrest warrants for persons who are wanted by them.  The United States Forces shall act in full and effective coordination with the Government of Iraq to turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi authorities pursuant to a valid Iraqi arrest warrant and shall release all the remaining detainees in a safe and orderly manner, unless otherwise requested by the Government of Iraq and in accordance with Article 4 of this Agreement.

 

5.  The United States Forces may not search houses or other real estate properties except by order of an Iraqi judicial warrant and in full coordination with the Government of Iraq, except in the case of actual combat operations conducted pursuant to Article 4.

 

 

Article 23
Implementation

 
Implementation of this Agreement and the settlement of disputes arising from the interpretation and application thereof shall be vested in the following bodies:

                                 
1.  A Joint Ministerial Committee shall be established with participation at the Ministerial level determined by both Parties.  The Joint Ministerial Committee shall deal with issues that are fundamental to the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement. 

 

2.  The Joint Ministerial Committee shall establish a JMOCC consisting of representatives from both Parties.  The JMOCC shall be co-chaired by representatives of each Party.

 

3.  The Joint Ministerial Committee shall also establish a Joint Committee consisting of representatives to be determined by both Parties.  The Joint Committee shall be co-chaired by representatives of each Party, and shall deal with all issues related to this Agreement outside the exclusive competence of the JMOCC.

 

4.  In accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, the Joint Committee shall establish Joint Sub-Committees in different areas to consider the issues arising under this Agreement according to their competencies.

 

Article 24

Withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq

 

 

Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, the assumption of full security responsibility by those Forces, and based upon the strong relationship between the Parties, an agreement on the following has been reached:

 

1.  All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011. 

 

2.   All United States combat forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than the time at which Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility for security in an Iraqi province, provided that such withdrawal is completed no later than June 30, 2009.

 

3.   United States combat forces withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 2 above shall be stationed in the agreed facilities and areas outside cities, villages, and localities to be designated by the JMOCC before the date established in paragraph 2 above.

 

4.  The United States recognizes the sovereign right of the Government of Iraq to request the departure of the United States Forces from Iraq at any time.  The Government of Iraq recognizes the sovereign right of the United States to withdraw the United States Forces from Iraq at any time.

 

5.  The Parties agree to establish mechanisms and arrangements to reduce the number of the United States Forces during the periods of time that have been determined, and they shall agree on the locations where the United States Forces will be present.

 

 

Article 25

Measures to Terminate the Application of Chapter VII to Iraq

 

Acknowledging the right of the Government of Iraq not to request renewal of the Chapter VII authorization for and mandate of the multinational forces contained in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007) that ends on December 31, 2008;

 

Taking note of the letters to the UN Security Council from the Prime Minister of Iraq and the Secretary of State of the United States dated December 7 and December 10, 2007, respectively, which are annexed to Resolution 1790;

 

Taking note of section 3 of the Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship, signed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Iraq on November 26, 2007, which memorialized Iraq’s call for extension of the above-mentioned mandate for a final period, to end not later than December 31, 2008:

 

Recognizing also the dramatic and positive developments in Iraq, and noting that the situation in Iraq is fundamentally different than that which existed when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661 in 1990, and in particular that the threat to international peace and security posed by the Government of Iraq no longer exists, the Parties affirm in this regard that with the termination on December 31, 2008 of the Chapter VII mandate and authorization for the multinational force contained in Resolution 1790, Iraq should return to the legal and international standing that it enjoyed prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), and that the United States shall use its best efforts to help Iraq take the steps necessary to achieve this by December 31, 2008.

 

 

Article 26

Iraqi Assets

 

1.  To enable Iraq to continue to develop its national economy through the rehabilitation of its economic infrastructure, as well as providing necessary essential services to the Iraqi people, and to continue to safeguard Iraq’s revenues from oil and gas and other Iraqi resources and its financial and economic assets located abroad, including the Development Fund for Iraq, the United States shall ensure maximum efforts to:

 

a. Support Iraq to obtain forgiveness of international debt resulting from the policies of the former regime.

 

b. Support Iraq to achieve a comprehensive and final resolution of outstanding reparation claims inherited from the previous regime, including compensation requirements imposed by the UN Security Council on Iraq.

 

2.  Recognizing and understanding Iraq’s concern with claims based on actions perpetrated by the former regime, the President of the United States has exercised his authority to protect from United States judicial process the Development Fund for Iraq and certain other property in which Iraq has an interest.  The United States shall remain fully and actively engaged with the Government of Iraq with respect to continuation of such protections and with respect to such claims.

 

3.  Consistent with a letter from the President of the United States to be sent to the Prime Minister of Iraq, the United States remains committed to assist Iraq in connection with its request that the UN Security Council extend the protections and other arrangements established in Resolution 1483 (2003) and Resolution 1546 (2003) for petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas originating in Iraq, proceeds and obligations from sale thereof, and the Development Fund for Iraq.

 

 

Article 27

Deterrence of Security Threats

 

In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability, the Parties shall work actively to strengthen the political and military capabilities of the Republic of Iraq to deter threats against its sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and its constitutional federal democratic system.  To that end, the Parties agree as follows:

 

1.     In the event of any external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq that would violate its sovereignty, political independence, or territorial integrity, waters, airspace, its democratic system or its elected institutions, and upon request by the Government of Iraq, the Parties shall immediately initiate strategic deliberations and, as may be mutually agreed, the United States shall take appropriate measures, including diplomatic, economic, or military measures, or any other measure, to deter such a threat.

 

2.     The Parties agree to continue close cooperation in strengthening and maintaining military and security institutions and democratic political institutions in Iraq, including, as may be mutually agreed, cooperation in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces, in order to combat domestic and international terrorism and outlaw groups, upon request by the Government of Iraq.

 

3.     Iraqi land, sea, and air shall not be used as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries.

 

 

Article 28

The Green Zone

 

Upon entry into force of this Agreement the Government of Iraq shall have full responsibility for the Green Zone.   The Government of Iraq may request from the United States Forces limited and temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of security for the Green Zone.  Upon such request, relevant Iraqi authorities shall work jointly with the United States Forces authorities on security for the Green Zone during the period determined by the Government of Iraq.

 

 

Article 29

Implementing Mechanisms

 

Whenever the need arises, the Parties shall establish appropriate mechanisms for implementation of Articles of this Agreement, including those that do not contain specific implementation mechanisms.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Article 30

The Period for which the Agreement is Effective

 
1.  This Agreement shall be effective for a period of three years, unless terminated sooner by either Party pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.

 
2.  This Agreement shall be amended only with the official agreement of the Parties in writing and in accordance with the constitutional procedures in effect in both countries.

 

3.  This Agreement shall terminate one year after a Party provides written notification to the other Party to that effect.

 
4.  This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 2009, following an exchange of diplomatic notes confirming that the actions by the Parties necessary to bring the Agreement into force in accordance with each Party’s respective constitutional procedures have been completed.  

 

 

 

 

Signed in duplicate in Baghdad on this 17^th day of November, 2008, in the English and Arabic languages, each text being equally authentic.

 

 

 

FOR THE UNITED                                               FOR THE     

STATES OF AMERICA:                                      REPUBLIC OF IRAQ:

Tags: Iraq, SOFA

Iraq-U.S. Accord Wipes Out Contractor Immunity

Nov 24, 2008 Industry News, Iraq, Middle East

 

By Gopal Ratnam and Viola Gienger at Bloomberg News

Nov. 20 (Bloomberg) — U.S. government contractors in Iraq are balking at a new agreement that eliminates their immunity from local laws, saying thousands of Americans would be subject to a legal system that still fails international standards.

“This agreement throws the DoD contractors under the bus,” said Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association, a trade group that represents 57 firms that provide services including security, development and military support. Pretrial detention and incarceration in Iraq are “way below” global standards, he said.

The Defense Department and State Department briefed their private contractors today on a provision of the so-called status- of-forces accord that eliminates contractors’ immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law. While the agreement applies to U.S. military operations, the State Department told its contractors today that Iraq will make them subject to the same rules.

The provision is part of an agreement that would govern U.S. military operations in Iraq after a United Nations Security Council resolution expires on Dec. 31. About 28,000 of the 163,500 people employed as Pentagon contractors in Iraq are U.S. citizens. Others are Iraqis or citizens of other countries, according to Defense Department data. About 4,500 of the State Department’s 5,500 contractors in Iraq are U.S. citizens.

`Green Zone’

The accord calls for U.S. combat forces to withdraw from cities and villages by June 30, 2009, and from the entire country by the end of 2011. It also returns the heavily fortified “Green Zone” that houses the U.S. Embassy in central Baghdad to Iraqi control.

Military surveillance over the country’s airspace also will return to Iraqi authority under the agreement. Iraq can ask the U.S. to provide temporary support for surveillance and air traffic control. The U.S. also must coordinate military activities through a new joint coordinating board.

U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari signed the agreement earlier this week after approval by Iraq’s Cabinet. It must be approved by Iraq’s parliament, which dissolved into shouting yesterday during debate over the accord, according to the New York Times. A parliamentary vote is scheduled for Nov. 24.

“This is going to create costs for contractors because every contractor will need additional insurance coverage” to protect against the risk of prosecutions, said Tara Lee, a lawyer at DLA Piper LLP in Reston, Virginia, who has represented private security contractors in Iraq. “There’s an increased likelihood of civil litigation costs for companies in the U.S. every time an investigation is opened in Iraq.”

KBR, DynCorp, Fluor

The agreement says Iraq “shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction” over U.S. contractors and their employees. Some Americans already are subject to Iraqi law because their companies contract directly with Iraq’s government.

KBR Inc. of Houston, DynCorp International Inc. of Falls Church, Virginia, and Fluor Corp. of Irving, Texas, provide food, fuel and supply services for the U.S. Army in Iraq in a contract worth about $5 billion.

Blackwater Worldwide of Moyock, North Carolina, and Triple Canopy Inc. of Herndon, Virginia, are among the firms that provide security for U.S. officials under contracts with the State Department.

“I would imagine that no matter what the legal protections are for contractors operating” in Iraq, the country “will remain a profitable enough business that you will still see a number of contractors willing to do this,” Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said at a news briefing yesterday.

Blackwater

Concerns about the role of private security contractors escalated after a Sept. 16 incident last year, in which 17 Iraqi civilians died, involving a Blackwater Worldwide team guarding a State Department convoy. The Baghdad incident remains under investigation.

Blackwater employees have been involved in at least 195 shooting incidents since 2005, firing the first shot more than 80 percent of the time, according to a report prepared last year by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. Twenty-three Blackwater employees had died in Iraq since 2003, according to U.S. Labor Department statistics.

Blackwater spokeswoman Anne Tyrrell and Fluor Corp. spokesman Keith Stephens didn’t return calls seeking comment. KBR spokeswoman Heather Browne said the company couldn’t comment because it has “not fully reviewed the agreement.” Doug Ebner, spokesman for DynCorp, declined to comment.

Tags: Blackwater, contractors, immunity, Iraq, SOFA